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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Background 
Seventy-five years ago, James Bryce wrote that "to the great mass 
of mankind in all places, public questions come into the third and 
fourth rank among the interests of life, and obtain less than a third 
or a fourth of the leisure available for thinking. 111 This is probably 
still true, yet if gover.nment is to be democratic, it is frequently 
necessary--by definition--for gover.nment to discover and heed public 
opinion. Such an instance recently occurred in the United Kingdom's 
first referendum, held June 51 1?75. ~t issue was whether Britain's 
future would be spent with the European Community or whether she would 
"go it aloneQ" The public's decision, expressed by a two to one ma-
jority, was for Great Britain to cast her lot with Europe. 2 
Bryce's observation pertained prim~rily to domestic public policy. 
If the public thinks little about domestic politics, it is even less 
1 James Bryce, "The Nature of Public Opinion," Reader in PUblic 
Opinion and Communications, ed. Bernard Berelson and MorriSIJanowitz 
(2nd ed., New York, 1966), p. 16. • 
2But if the vote had been taken at a different time, the verdict 
might have been the opposite. Though the public opinion polls sometimes 
show wide margins against British membership in the Common Market, one 
cannot be certain that the phrasing of the referendum question could not 
have added a sufficient number of pro-~arket votes to produce an affirma-
tive vote. See Appendix A for variance.between questions. 
1 
2 
concerned with matters of foreign policy. Of American opinion formation, 
Campbell and Belknap wrote that many citizens simply adhere to their per-
ception of their party's policy without attempting to fathom the ration-
ale of foreign policy positions. 3 · Markel and Kriesberg were dismayed 
to find 11Dark Areas of Ignorance" in foreign affairs knowledge possessed 
by democratic people.4 Almond is more sympathetic to the public: 5 
There are inherent limitations in modem society on the capac-
ity of the public to understand the issues and grasp the sig-
nificance of the most important problems of public policy. 
This is particularly the case with foreign policy where the 
issues are especially complex and remote. 
Almond advised governments to heed the broader constraints of public 
opinion, but not to force the average voter to participate in foreign 
policy formulation., 6 Nevertheless, "the democratic myth is that the 
people are inherently wise and just, and that they are the real rulers 1 
of the republic."? And occasionally the "myth" becomes reality when, 
as in Britain this year, government must unify public support. 
As might then be expected on a foreign policy issue, the British 
public has historically been ambivalent toward Common Market member-
ship. In their broad examination of voter attitudes, Butler and Stokes 
classified the issue as one of "low potential," which is equivalent to 
3Angus Campbell and George Belknap, "Political Party Identification 
and Attitudes Towa:r:d Foreign Policy," Public Opinion Quarterly, XJl 
(1951)' p. 623. 
~artin Kriesberg, "Dark Areas of Ignorance," Public Opinion and 
Foreign Policy, ed. Lester Markel et al. (New York, 1949), pp. 49-50. 
Also cf. Markel's comments on p. 9. 
5Gabriel A. Almond, The American People and Foreign Policy (New 
York, 1950), P• 5. 
6Ibid., PP• 5-6. 
? Ibid. , P• 4. 
3 
salience. 8 Of all the issues included in their study, the proportion 
of the "don't know" responses on the Common Market membership was found 
to be higher than on any other issues. 9 The low salience of this issue 
has given successive governments considerable latitude--and the salience 
has perhaps been manipulated on occasion. However, low salience is not 
normatively evaluated in this study. It is merely accepted as one of 
the characteristics of public opinion on the issue. 
Two Turnarounds in Public Opinion 
An eighteen year compilation of British attitudes toward the Common 
Market reveals two reversals: Between December, 1966 and the end of 
April, 1967 the majority of the public moved from support to opposition; 
between the same months of 1974 and 1975, the opposite mqvement took 
place. 
In May, 1966, the 18 year peak in the ratio of affirmative to nega-
tive opinion on this issue was reached: Community membership was fa-
vored seven to one. 10 At the end of 1966 the Wilson Government announced 
its intention to begin probing the prospects of Britain joining the 
Community. In December, cabinet ministers visited the European capi-
tals. "Thereafter, as their 1 visits to the Six progressed, there was 
• • • a steady fall in public support until in April, only 43 ,percent 
8David Butler and Donald Stokes, Political Change in Britain: 
Forces Shaping Electoral Choice (New York, 1969), p. 35b7 The authors 
use the two terms interchangeably. 
9rbid. 
10Definition of the figures is derived from Gallup Poll, Ltd., 
"British Attitudes Towards the Common Market," (Mimeographed data, June, 
1975). The particular question is the same as the first used in Figure 
1. 
4 
of the public were :in favour aga:inst 67 percent :in late November. 1111 
After deGaulle's second nix of British membership :in mid-May, pro-
Marketeer optimism further atrophied. 
After deGaulle's retirement :in April of 1969, speculation began to 
reappear on British prospects for entry into the European Community. 
In July, Pompidou expressed that France would not aga:in block negotia-
tions. But rather than positively respond:ing to the radical growth of 
the chance that Brita:in could join, the British public seemed to be of-
fended by the new conciliatory French approach. Negative responses 
gradually rose to around 60 percent while affirmative responses fell to 
about 20 percent. This aggregate response pattern held throughout the 
negotiations phase. 
Under the Heath Government, Brita:in jo:ined the EC (European Com-
munity) January 1, 1973. As price :increases began to grow, so did re-
sentment of membership terms. Subsequent to late 1973, the price :in-
creases resulting from membership were compounded by :increas:ing world-
wide inflation and the difficulties resulting from the Middle East oil 
embargo and price hikes. When Mr. Heath resigned as Prime Minister and 
was replaced by Mr. Wilson, the new Labour Government demanded renege-
tiation of membership terms. The demand was met by the Community 
member-states, and renegotiations commenced in April, 1974. As renege-
tions approached completion in the early part of 1975, another turn-
around appeared :in public op:inion on the issue. The shift was in the 
opposite direction of the turnaround exact~y eight years earlier. By 
mid-April, 46 percent advocated continued membership while 36 percent 
11[Henry Durant,] "Public Op:inion and the EEC," Journal of Common 
Market Studies, VI (1968), p. 234· 
5 
were still opposed. 
Figure 1 is a graphic representation of.the reversals on the issue. 
The British Institute of Public Opinion asked quota samples the fol-
lowing questions during the periods depicted: 12 
Oct 1966-Apr, 1967: If the British Government were to decide 
that Britain~s interest would best be served by joining the 
European Common Market, would you approve or disapprove? 
May, 1967: Do you approve or disapprove of the Government 
applying for membership of the European Common Market? 
October, 1974-May 1975: Do you think that we were right or 
wrong to join the Common Market? · 
The Problem and its Plausible Causes 
The preceding background discussion leads directly to the central 
question to be investigated: In such a situation where public opinion 
becomes critically important in foreign policy determination, what 
determines public opinion? In this specific case, the question is 
simply "Why did these two reversals go in opposite directions?" Theory 
offers three plausible explanations: that'the public responds to changes 
in leadership views 7 to policy momentum, and/or to media influence. 
Leadership ~ Party Influences 
As noted above, Angus Campbell has said that many American voters 
gain their foreign policy attitudes "from a conscious or unconscious 
12Gallup Poll, Ltd.: the non-probability sampling success of the 
organization is accepted in this study. For a fairly comprehensive de-
bate on its merits, see R. L. Leonard, Elections in Britain (London, 
1968), pp. 131, 137; H. J. Eysenck, "Are Opinion Polls Adequate?" En-
counter (February, 1965), p.,54; and letters published in Encounter-
(1965): from Durant, March,:pp. 93-94; Hyett, April, p. 90; Campbell, 
May, p. 92; Lipset, July, pp. 92-93; Leonard, August, PP• 92-95; and 
Eysenck, October, PP• 44-45· 
Figure 1. Two Turnarounds in British Public Opinion Toward the European 
Community. 
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8 
adherence to a perceived party line, rather from influences independent 
of party identification. n1.3 · ·,StudyiNg· the British public, Butler and 
Stokes found that the British similarly depend heavily'on party stances 
for resolution of issue attitudes. An issue will never exercise "any-
thing like its potential impact" unless the public can "differentiate . 
the party positions. 1114 
A cursory examination of the two. turnarounds seems to indicate that 
the influence of the parties cannot account for much of the evidence, 
however. In both periods, the Conservative and Liberal Parl.jies solidly 
supported Common Market membership while the Labour Party's stand was 
somewhat ambivalent. In 1967 and again in 1975, a Labour Government 
advocated membership toward the erid of the turnaround. It would seem 
incongruous to suppose that such similarly structured influences could 
have caused both directions of opinion change. 
Though in Britain, "attitudes towards the parties emerge as the 
stronger influence';" attitudes toward individual nationally-lmown leaders 
are a distinct influence. 15 ~ere again, one finds strikingly similar 
situations in 1967 .and }975, but a complete accoll?t would be unwieldy. · 
The daily newspapers~ handling of the leaders will be examined in 
Chapter IV. Although the data cannot lead to positive conclusions about 
the leadership influence, perhaps they will facilitate understanding of 
· that factor. 
13campbell and Bellmap, p. 623. 
14Butler and Sto~es, p. 350. 
15Ibid., P• 384. 
Policy Momentum 
Professor Hennessy teaches that attitude objects may be placed on 
a continuum of "probability of agreement. 1116 From the least degree of 
agreement to the highest, are five attitude object classifications: 
9 
Sacrilege coincides with the smallest probability of agreement, followed 
by private ideas, then proposals, then policies, and finally, tradition 
carries with it the highest probability of agreement. He explains why 
existing policy has an advantage (in public support) over proposals: 17 
\ 
Real or imagined advantages may be found in the policy, and as 
lives are adjusted to the demands and benefits of the policy, 
support for it increases. Or, at the very least, attention is 
reduced by the adoption of a bette~the-know.n-evil perspective. 
At an even higher level of generalization, there is a presump-
tion in favor of existing policy, a presumption compounded of 
the ease of the habit principle, the majesty of the law, and 
desire for social stability which can be achieved only when 
there is much agreement on many governmental policies. 
This generalization can be readily applied to the turnarounds in this 
study. In January of 1967, not only was the Commonwealth established 
policy, but it was tradition. This clearly would give the Commonwealth 
relationship a higher "probability of agreement" rating than the pro-
posal to join the EC. Since Community membership would tend to at least 
loosen Commonwealth ties, as the change in policy appeared to be nearing, 
the public apparently began to reconsider. 
Conversely, by January of 197 5, Britain had been in the European 
Community for two years: This correlated to Hennessy's "established 
policy~" Again as the prospect of a policy change grew nearer, the 
16 Bernard c. Hennessy, Public Opinion (3rd ed., North Scituate, Ma., 
1975), p. 325. 
17Ibid., p. 327. 
10 
public be~an to reconsider. 
Thus, the concept of policy momentum seems to provide at least a 
part of the answer to the question of turnaround causation. Indeed, it 
could possibly be the prime cause, but the c~ncept presents empirical 
investigation difficulties that cannot be breached in this study. How-
ever, through investigating the remaining plausible influence, the 
policy momentum effect may at least approximate residual boundaries. 
Media Influence 
Because the media comprise the link through which .all communications 
to the mass must pass, it preempts much of the credit for influence that 
should perhaps be attributed to the sway of political leaders. On the 
other hand, the great bulk of mass exposure of the leaders must, indeed, 
be carried through the media. Consequently, in America, the media as a 
18 
whole are often referred to as "the fourth branch of government." 
The influence exerted by the' media may be estimated by examining 
its output. Those who praise the media refer to that output as informa-
tion; critics may type it as propaganda. But whether the output is in-
formation or propaganda is not critically important in assessing the 
direction of its influence--in either case, the same indicators apply. 
Common usage of the term, media, implies both the electronic media 
and the press. But investigation will be limited, in this study, to the 
press. The electronic media are excluded for several reasons: First, 
tight regulation by the state tends to ameliorate any prejudicial im-
pact that radio and television might convey in Britain. Second,' the 
18Raymond N. Habiby, lecture given at Oklahoma State University, 
Stillwater, Oklahoma, July 11, 1975. 
11 
radio has never been used for peacetime political purposes in the United 
Kingdom. 19 Third, mundane impracticability derives from the inaccessi-
bility of the British electronic media to an American researcher. Fi-
nally, Butler and Stokes found that the particular mode of information 
(or propaganda) transmission was irrelevant to its impact; media inte~ 
dependence for data and topic duplication were so permeating that no 
difference was found in resulting opinion formation and changes. 20 Thus, 
the impact of the electronic media might be assumed to be similar to 
that of the press. 
"The output of the press" generally connotes any written matter 
which is available to a mass readership. In Britain, there are over 
four thousand magazines available, 21 but few of these have sufficient 
readership to exert a significant influence on national issues. 22 They 
will be assumed to parallel the predominant influence in the press, as 
suggested by Butler and Stokes. 23 The same assumption must necessarily 
extend to most newspapers: About 140 daily and Sunday papers, and over 
1200 weeklies are published in Britain. 24 This useful assumption pe~ 
mits the press to be operationally defined as the eight major national 
daily newspapers. 
19Butler and Stokes, p. 227. 
20rbid., pp. 227-228. 
21Marjorie Wilkerson, ~ and Newspapers (London, 1970), p. 92. 
22 John C. Merrill, Carter R. Bryan, and Marvin Alisky, The Foreign 
Press: !:, Survey of the World's Journalism (2nd ed., Baton Rouge, 1972) 7 
P• 59. 
23Butler and Stokes, pp. 227-228. 
24wilkerson, p. 92. 
12 
The national papers are unusually important in the United Kingdom. 
Of all nations, Britain was until recently the one uwhose proportion of 
newspaper readers is the highest in the world. 1125 The geography of the 
nation "allows for a system 9f rapid distribution; a gigantic population 
close to London makes it possible for nearly everyone in the United King-
dom who wants to read a 'national' paper to do ~o."~6 : The national 
daily newspaper will form the empiri·cal base for the hypotheses. 
Hypotheses 
The role of the media in these two foreign policy opinion reversals 
will be assessed through the general hypot~e~~l3 ~P.licit in the preceding 
survey of plausible influences: Public opinion on foreign affairs is 
determined by the combined influences of leadership, policy momentum, 
and the media. In this study the first two potential sources of in-
fluence are largely controlled as in a field experiment: The "policy 
momentum" factor, though differing between the two periods, was held 
constant throughout each--with no change in the temporal proximity of 
the public opinion reversals. More tenuous is the control of "leader'-
ship and political party" influence: Though controlled at the national 
level, an assumption is required that the local leader influence would 
be either similar or negligible. 
Limitations 
This general hypothesis (even with the above assumption concerning 
25Butler and Stokes, p. 219. Cf. Merrill, Bryan, and Alisky, p. 59: 
~ 1972, Britain was surpassed in readership by Norway and Sweden. 
26Berrill7 . Bryan, and Alisky, p. 59. 
13 
leadership and the earlier assumption of media interdependence) is not 
subject to "proof" for three reasons: First, this is a comparative 
study of two selected cases. No basis will exist for inference to the 
universe of media influence on foreign policy public opinion. Second, 
because the other two potential causes are "controlled," no data will 
be generated about their influenceG Third, final causality cannot be 
proved •. Lazarfeld's first two criteria for causality (time and corre-
lation), as adapted by Babbie, may be met, but the third is unattainable: 
Beyond the "experimental controls," it cannot be demonstrated "that the 
observed empirical relationship cannot be 'explained away' as being due 
to the influence of some third variable" external to media' content and 
bl . . . h 27 pu ~c opm~on c ange. As indicated on page nine, delayed reaction 
to "policy momentum" could conceivably be responsible for the attitude 
changes. Nevertheless the general hypothesis may be tentatively accepted 
if the data are found to support it within these stated limits. 
Specific Hypotheses 
The general hypothesis will be empirically tested through four 
i 
specific hypotheses: mere exposure, directional bias, content relevancy, 
and treatment of leaders. Each of these four will tap a differ~nt mode 
of media influence, and collectively, they might;be viewed as a potential 
composite ~dex of mediq. bias. 
I 
~ Exposure. Gallup polls probing for dimensional definition of 
! 
the Common'Market issue show that there is a high degree of correlation 
27EarliR. Babbie, The Practice of Social Research (Belmont, Ca., 
1975), PP• 370-371. 
14 
between knowledge of the EC and support for British membership. 28 Butler 
and Stokes found that between 1964 and 1966, .British public support for 
the Common Market increased with the rate of exposure to information on 
the issue. 29 These findings could be explained with the suggestion that 
the pro-Marketeer will want to read and retain more about the Community 
as a matter of preference--not that the amount of knowledge determines 
the preference. Yet psychological studies indicate that "mere repeated 
exposure to a stimulus is a sufficient condition for the enhancement of 
[the subject's] attitude toward it. u30 This phenomenon is the corollary 
of the avoidance reflex characteristically exhibited by animals (in-
cluding man) toward the unfamiliar. 31 
Whatever directional bias may be found in attempts at persuasive 
communication, the "attitude object" must be mentioned repeatedly, 
whether the attempt is directed toward molding favorable or unfavorable 
opinion. "Making attitudes more favorable should, therefore, be easier 
than making them less favorable. u3_2 
If this "mere exposure" phenomenon played a significant part in the 
turnarounds, the communication to be examined may be expected to differ 
in frequency of stimulus presentation: The 1967 papers would be found 
to contain less coverage of the issue than would those of 1975• Thus, 
28 Gallup Poll, PP• 52-53· 
29Butler and Stokes, p. 226. 
3°Robert B. Zajonc, "Attitudinal Effects of M~re Exposure," Readings 
in Attitude Change," ed. Samuel Hiinmelfarb and Alice H. Eagly (New York, 
I974), P• 52. 
31Ibid., P• 75. 
32Ibid., p. 80. 
the first empirical hypothesis is posed: 
Strength of support for Common Market membership is 
directly related to the quantity of national newspaper 
coverage of the issue. · 
15 
If the data support this hypothesis, then the proposition that mere ex-
posure causes increased support would be more plausible, but should not 
be considered proved. There are too many uncontrolled variables to de-
rive an unqualified causal relationship in the present study. 
Another limitation of the mere exposure effect is noted by Zajoncg 
When reward and punishment are associated with the stimulus 1 they take 
precedence over frequency of exposure consequences.33 In political com-
munication, reward and punishment take the form of directional state-
ments about the effects of the stimulus (the European Community, in this 
case). Such directional statements are measured in the second hypothesis. 
Manifest Bias. This mode of influence is what Lipmann and ~thers 
have in mind when referring to "the pQwer of the press. 11 A directional 
. • I .. . 
bias from a trusted source may be dire.ctly transferred to the reader. 
Lipmann explained that we retain from ·our childhood the need to 
make our connections with the out:er world through certain 
beloved and authoritative person:;;. They are the first bridge 1 
to the invisible world. And though we may gradually master 
for ourselves many phases of th~t larger environment, there 
always remains a vaster one that is unknown. To that we still 
relate ourselves through authorities. Where all the facts · 
are out of sight a true report and a plausible·· error read 
alike, feel alike, sound alike. Except on a few subjects 
where our own knowledge is great,, we c~~t choose between 
trustworthy and untrustworthy reporters. 
In Britain 1 the newspapers are, indeed, perceived by their readers as 
33Ibid., P• 75. 
34walter Lippmann, Public Opinion (New York, 1965), PP• 142-143· 
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trustworthy sources.35 
As previously noted, :ill foreign affairs\ the public is e:s:pecially 
dependent on the media for opmion formation. If directional bias :ill 
the media was significant :ill the turnarounds, the coverage found :ill the 
1966-67 papers will be less favorable to the European Community than 
will be the 1974-75 coverage. 
Growth of support for the Common Market is related to 
the pro-Market bias in 1974-75 newspaper coverage; 
diminution of support is related to the anti-Market 
bias :ill the :1966-67 coverage. 
' Directional bias can be effective, but particular circumstances 
determme the limits of its potential impact. Lazarfeld and Merton 
found that monopolization is requisite to optimum effectiveness--only 
then can the media "exhibit the degree of social power commonly at-
tributed to them."36 
Content Relevancy. Opinions often come more from association of 
ideas than by reasoned deliberation.37 The most effective persuasive 
communication will therefore be very relevant to the attitudes of the 
recipient.38 After each of the two turnarounds, the Gallup organization 
probed to fmd the attitudes of the public contributing to opmions on 
the Common Market issue. The attitudes exposed by Gallup will be used 
35Merrill, Bryan, and Alisky, p. 59. 
36Paul F. Lazarfeld and Robert K. Merton, "Requisite Conditions for 
Propaganda Success," Voice of~ People: Readmgs 2:!! Public Op:illion 
~ Propaganda, ed. Reo M. Christenson and Robert o. McWilliams (2nd 
ed., New York, 1967), PP• 340, 343· 
37Charles A. Siepmann, "Propaganda Teclmiques," Voice of the People: 
Readmgs :ill Public O;wmion ~ Propaganda, ed. Reo M. Christenson and 
Robert 0. McWilliams (2nd ed., New York, 1967), p. 335. 
38Ibid., P• 339. 
to investigate this third hypothesis: 
The direction of opinion at the end of each period cor-
responds to the direction of relevant arguments relayed 
by the press during the turnaround. 
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There is an inescapable element of overlap here with the concept of mani-
fest directional bias; i.e., the underlying attitudes used to test H3 
may have been implanted by media influence. The probable degree of 
tautology in H3 will increase with the strength of support to be found 
for H2• If the reader desires~ he may simply view the content relevancy 
testing as a further dimension of the manifest'bias test. 
Treatment of Leaders. The leadership influence posited above is 
effective at the mass level only through the image which the media trans-
mit to the public; the press can potentially modify the leadership in-
fluence. 
Tannenbaum demonstrated that lowering the subject's evaluation of 
a source produced a corresponding change in attitude toward a concept 
associated with the source.39 In this analysis, the "source" is the in-
dividual leader advocating a position on the issue; the "concept" is the 
Common Market. The following hypothesis will be tested: 
The drop in Common Market support in 1967 is related to 
more favorable press coverage given to anti-Market leaders; 
the growth in Community support in 1975 is related to more 
favorable coverage of pro-Market leaders. 
Together, these four hypotheses provide a means of assessing the 
total role of the press in these two critical periods of British public 
opinion toward the European Community. 
39Percy H. Tannenbaum, "])llediated Genera:t.ization of Attitude Change 
via the Principle of Congruity," Readings in Attitude Change, ed. Samuel 
Himmelfarb and Alice H. Eagly (New York, 1974), pp. 210-217. 
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Methodology 
The operational frame of the specific hypotheses consists of all 
issues of the eight national dailies from December 1, 1966:through 
April 30, 1967; and from December 1, 1974 through April 30, 1975. The 
following newspapers were invariably designated as the eight major daily 
British papers by Merrill, Bryan, and Alisky; by Wilkerson; by UNESCO; 
and by Butler and Stokes. They are, in order of circulation volume 
(highest to lowest): 
Daily Mirror 
Daily Express 
Daily Mail 
Daily Telegraph 
Sun 
Daily Sketch 
·Times 
Guardian 
The Daily Mail is unavailable for examination, and the Daily Sketch was 
discontinued in 1974. For these reasons, the sample frame will be 
limited to the remaining six dailies. 
Data for the hypotheses analyses will be obtained from stratified 
random samples of each paperg The sample frame of 1536 issues will be 
stratified into months. Then a random number table will determine two 
dates within each month for each of the six dailies. This procedure 
will yield a total of 120 issues as a sample of the frame. 
Hypothel?il? One, the mere exposur~ ~;ypot?esis, posits a correlation 
between the amount of coverage and the direction of turnaround. This 
relationship will be tested by comparing the number of lines devoted to 
the issue during the two periods. If the number of lines expended in 
1974-1975 is 50 percent greater than in 1966-1967, the hypothesis will 
be considered_ to_ be supported. 
19 
The second hw,othesis concerns the correlation between directional 
bias found in the press and the direction of turnaround. Articles in 
the sample will be coded as follows: 
+1 for each article favorable to the EC, 
0 for each neutral article, and 
-1 for each article deleterious to the EC. 
The hypothesis will be supported if the total weighted score for the 
earlier (negative) period is significantly less than that of the later 
(affirmative) period. 
The testing f~r the next hypothesis, content relevancy, will rest 
on attitudes related to the issue. Structure of the coding will be 
determined by the Gallup findings of attitude factors (referred to in 
the hypothesis discussion above): 
+1 for an explicit argument favorable to the 
advocated positio:n,· and 
-1 for an explicit admission that a factor is 
prejudicial to the advocated positidn. 
The next testing step is weighting: The components of each argument 
will be converted into percentages proportionate to the response fre-
quency in the Gallup findings. The final step consists of combining 
the weighted factor codes and comparing the two arguments for each 
period. The hypothesis will be supported if the 1966-1967 anti-Market 
score is greater than that of the pro-Market, while the opposite case 
in the later period is expected. 
The fourth hypothesis 7 treatment of leaders, will be tested as 
follows~ All articles referring directly to leaders taking a definite 
stand on the issue will be scored: 
+1 for a positive comment on a pro-Marketeer, 
-1. for a negative comment on a pro-Marketeer, 
-1 for a positive comment on an anti-Marketeer, and 
+1 for a negative comment on an' anti-Marketeer. 
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The results for each period will be dete~ined by adding the total 
scores for each period. The hypothesis will be supported by a negative 
\ 
sum from the 1966-1967 sample and a positive sum from the 1974-1975 
sample. 
Level .2.£ Significance~ Circ~~tion Weighting 
Acceptance of the last three hypotheses is contingent on one-tailed 
2' Chi tests. 
No statistical test can be conducted on the mere exposure hypothesis 
(~). As stated above, this hypothesis will be accepted if the number 
of lines in the second period exceeds that of the first by 50 percent. 
However, due to the arbitrary nature of this criterion, a conservative 
approach will be taken: Both unweighted and weighted data will be re-
quired to meet the 50 percent increase criterion. 
Once the hypotheses are accepted or rejected (with the exception 
of H1), the data will be 1weighted by relative circulation to more ac-
curately reflect the dailies' probable impact on the British public.· 
(See Appendix B.) 
Structure of ~ Study 
In order to assess the role of the national dailies in the changes 
of British public opinion toward the European Community, it is necessary 
to examine attitudinal trends on the membership issue. That is the sub-
ject of Chapter II. Chapter III will provide insight into the nature 
of the national dailies. In Chapter IV the hypotheses testing will pro-
vide objective insight into the role of the dailies in public opinion 
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toward the Common Market. Finally, Chapter V will assess that role and 
evaluate the methodology used in the investigation. 
CHAPTER II 
BRITISH PUBLIC OPINION TOWARD 
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 
This chapter consists of a composite trend history of public opinion 
on the issue, a discussion of latency as a major characteristic, and ~ 
examination of the major attitudinal factors in British public opinion 
toward the Community. 
Public Opinion Trends 
The earliest public opinion poll data on the issue consists of iso-
lated polls in 1957, 1959, _and 1960. Durin_g this early period, the 
issue was insufficiently known even to qualify as an issue under Hen-
nessy's definitional criteria. 1 Because of the British tendency to 
respond with a definite answer, public ambivalence is probably under-
estimated even by the high "don't know" (DK) response rates. 2 
1Bernard c. Hennessy, Public Opinion (3rd ed., North Scituate, Ma., 
1975), PP• 5-6, 8-9. 
2see Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Cultu;re (Prince-
ton, 1963), pp. 96-98: "Almost all of the poorly informed Americans, 
British, and Germans gave some answer • • • [E]ven the cognitively in-
competent feel free to express opinions. " This point is graphically 
illustrated in the September, 1961 Gallup poll: While 52 percent ex-
pressed support for the proposition that Britain join the EEC, 51 per-
cent did not know that she was not a member; and 70 percent did not 
know that Britain was a member of EFTA. Gallup Poll, Ltd. , · "l;3ritish 
Attitudes to the EEC 1960-1963," Journal of Common Market Studies, V 
(1966), PP• 52-53. 
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The British citizens were adjusting to the relatively new situation 
of being dwarfed by the two superpowers while in the final stages of co-
lonialism' s termination. In such a milieu, large numbers of the re-
spondents were willing to try a variety of alternatives to "going it 
alone."3 Yet toward the end of this initial period of extreme ambiva-
lence, of four alternatives offered by the poll, only two percent chose 
the alternative of abandoning the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) 
plan for "membership of the European Common Market."4 This seems to in-
dicate that the affirmative rates in the first polls imply far greater 
than was the actual positive support for EC membership. 
After the Macmillan Government decided to apply for Community mem-
bership in late August, 1961, the issue began to receive more attention. 
Following the Conservative Government 7 Conservative supporters became 
increasingly in favor of membership. The loyal opposition's more skepti-
cal view resulted in Labour voters beginning to respond negatively to 
the question. The negotiations were difficult for the Government, and 
public opinion on the issue throughout 1962 .~~ner~~y ,fo~lowed the vicis-
situdes of the bargaining. By the end of the year, ambivalence on the 
:i:ssue had receded to the extent that the numbers responding negatively 
were generally equivalent to the DK percentages. 5 In spite of the dif-
ficulties encountered during negotiations, 62 percent of Gallup's re-
3[ Henry Durant, J "Public Opinion and the EEC," Journal of Common 
Market Studies, VI {1968), pp. 238-239· 
4Gallup Poll, "· •• 1960-1963," p. 56. 
5As previously noted (page 22, footnote 2), the DK responses unde~ 
state the aggregate attitudinal ambivalence. Neverth~less, the vertical 
trends of the DK responses in relation to the alternative answers may be 
assumed indicative of valid changes in public opiriion. 
spondents in the December poll thought there was a "good chance" that 
Britain would join the Community; only nine percent responded that her 
6 
chances were poor. 
When in January, 1963 deGaulle announced that Britain would not be 
permitted to join the Common Market, the anti-Market position received 
an unexpected boost in public support. But the support apparently came 
from the DK group, for the pro-Marketeers maintained their strength 
through the succeeding_ two years--despite deGaulle' s veto. 
After the October, 1964 general election, the new Labour Government 
_began to view the Europe.an Community with increasjng f13.vor-this probably 
accounts for the attenuation of negative responses and the accompanying 
growth of affirmative support.? This trend was magnified by the general 
election of March, 1966, when all three major parties favored membership. 8 
In May, 1966, the 18 year peak in the ratio of affirmative to negative 
public opinion on this issue was reached: Community membership was 
favored seven to one. 
At the end of 1966 the Wilson Government announced its intentions 
to begin probing the prospects of Britain joining the Community. In 
December, cabinet ministers visited the European capitals. "Thereafter, 
as their visits to the Six progressed, there was a considerable exposure 
of the issue both on television and in the press. This was accompanied 
by a steady fall in public support until in April [1967] only 43 percent 
of the public were in favour against 67 percent in late November."9 
6Gallup Poll, II . . • 1960-1963," P• 51. 
7 [Durant,] p. 233· 
8Ibid. 
9Ibid., P• 234. 
Figure 2. British Public Opinion Toward Common Market Membership: 
September, 1967 Through May, 1965. 
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Figure 3· British Public Opinion Toward Common Market Membership: 
June, 1965 Through December, 1970. 
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Figure 4. British Public Opinion Toward Conunop Market Membership: 
January, 1971 Through June, 1975. · 
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After deGaulle's second veto of British membership in mid-May, pro-. 
Marketeer optimism further atrophied; and unlike four years earlier, 
the consequent rise of anti-Market sentiment was matched by a fall in 
pro-Market support. Even the pollsters lost interest in the issue. 
Only once during 1968 did the Gallup organization probe public opinion 
on the issue. 
After deGaulle 1 s retirement in April of 1969, speculation began to 
.~appear on British prospects for entry into the Europe~ Community. 
In July, Pompidou expressed that France would not again block negotia-
tions. But rather than positively responding to the radical growth of 
the chance that Britain could join, the British public seemed to be of-
fended by the now conciliatory .. French approach. Negative:responses 
g:J;"adually ros'e itO around 60 percent 'f'lhile affirmative responses fell to 
about 20 perqent •. This.agg~gate response pattern held thrqughout the 
negotiations phase. 
After the main points of British membership were ,settled in the 
. ln~gQt!~t?-~ms :in June, the Conservative Government advocated acceptance 
of the terms. ,The public initially responded favorably to the recorp-
mendation, but waiyer~d ?,S_r~pqJ:"ts of expE)ct~d fqs>d price increase~ be-
came widespread. However, after.the House of Conunons, ina·free vote, 
passed tl}e European Communities Bill without amendment, pU.blic support 
again increased. 'E.xcept for a brief interlude when. the pro-M?-rketeers 
saw their former EFTA partners win a favorable trade agreement with the I· . . 
EC in the sununer of 1972, the two sides were equally balanced until after 
the expanded Community came into being on January 1, 1973. 
As price increases began to grow, so ,did resentment of the mernbei'-
ship terms. Subsequent to late.1973, the pri~e increases resultint from 
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membership were compounded by increasing worldwide inflation and the 
difficulties resulting from the Midd~e-East oil embargo and price hikes. 
When Mr. Heath was replaced by Mr. Wilson as Prime Minis~er, the new 
Labour Gover.nment demanded renegotiation of membership terms. The de-
mand was met by the Community states, and renegotiations commenced in 
April, 197 4· 
By this time a schism had crystallized within the Labour Party over 
the issue. As an apparent attempt to reunite, the Labour Party Mani-
festo for the Octoqer general election included a pledge for a referendum 
on the question of continued EC membership. Though this compromise did 
not completely mend the division, it did succeed in preventing further 
ciet~rl.oration of Labour unity. The party's mass supporters did not 
receive any clear indication of the party• s stand, and public opinion 
on the issue exhibited no change. . As the renegotiations approached 
completion in the early part of 1975, another turnaround appeared in 
public opinion on the issue. This time the shift was in the opposite 
direction of the turnaround exactly eight years earlier. By mid-April, 
46 percent advocated continueQmembership while 36 percent were still 
opposed. After this time, public opinion on the issue did not change 
until the referendum, when the voters supported British membership in 
the European Community by a two to one margin. 10 
Latency and its Consequences 
Of the fairly restricted number of issues that are brought 
10rt is unlikely that the referendum vote reflects a change in actual 
opinions held. The difference in question phrasing accounts fdr between 
12 and 17 percent of the increased support, and distribution of the DK 
responses explains the remaining increase. See Appendix A. 
b~fore the public by political debate and the mass media we 
may conclude that only a few become matters that exite genuine 
and strong attitudes in significant parts of the r:tectorate. 
• • • Most never achieve any significance at all., 
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For the majority of its history, the European Community issue was 
not even brought before the public. The characteristic disinterest for 
most foreign policy matters applied in the fullest degree. The tolera-
tion traditionally attributed to the British, observed by Mandeville 300 
years ~go, correlated with what Eagly and Telaak refer to as a "wide 
latitude of acceptance." This wide latitude of acceptance is amplified 
on a latent issue--and this leads to unpredictability. 12 The chameleon-
like nature of this issue was demonstrated in a series of three surveys 
from 1963 to 1966: Of the eight issues examined, only Common Market 
entry exhibited a net negative correlation. It was less a part of party-
related clusters than any of the other issues checked. 13 
Issue 
Nationalization of industry 
Retention of nuclear weapons 
Common Market entry 
Immigration restrictions 
Capital punishment 
Big business restrictions 
Royal family status 
Trade union power 
Correlation 
Average ·CUmulative 
;{).25 +1.76 
;{).OS ;{).59 
-0.01 -0.06 
;{).09 ;{).61 
;{).19 +1.32 
;{).11 ;{).76 
_ _+0.14 +1.00 
;{).21 +1.46 
Of all the issues, the proportion of the sample declaring themselves as 
"don't know" was consi~tently highest on Common Market membership. 
11David E. Butler ~d Donald Stokes, Political Change ~ Britain: 
Forces Shaping Elector~l Choice (New York, 1969), p. 341. 
\ ' 
12Alice H. Eagly .and Kathleen Tel~ak, "~fidth of the Latitude of Ac-
ceptance as a Determi:nqnt of Attitude ·.Chang~," Readings ,!!! Attitude 
Change, ed. Samuel Himmelfarb and Alice H. ~agly (New York, 1974), p. 459. 
13Butler and Stoke$, P• 199. 
Allott characterizes the issue well: The Common Market, he says, 
has earned a place in that notorious series of troublesome 
foreign policy issues which are interesting enough to en-
gage the specialist, political enough to inspire strong 
feelings in those [few] who care, but esoteric enough to 
prevent t£~ir integration into the mainstream of domestic 
politics. 
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Consequently, political behavior in relation to the issue "has been ex-
ceptionally reflexive, responding mechanically to short-term develop-
ments in Britain and Europe." Its isolation from the mainstream of 
,• 
politics left the question "under-explored." "This has, in turn, led 
to exaggerated shock at such implications as have become apparent--the 
implications of joining • • • and the implications of standing aside. 1115 
The exaggerated shock effect, when it came, served to activate 
latency. Throughout 1966 the issue had received increasing attention 
from the British leadership. In the 1966 general election, Mr. Heath 
made Common Market membership a prime campaign issue; after defeating 
Mr. Heath, Prime Minister Wilson initiated his ow.n probe of the prospects 
of joining the organization; and in December, even more interest was 
demonstrated as ministers visited the national capitols of the Six. 
Political leadership was interested in the Common Market, yet public 
opinion on the issue showed no appreciable change. But in early 1967, 
AllottVs "exaggerated shock" materialized within the public's attitude: 
The British realized that the price for entry included an increase in 
food prices. 
14philip Allott, "Britain and Europe," Journal of Common Market 
Studies, XIII (1975), P• 203. 
15Ibid. , p. 204. 
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Major Attitudinal Factors 
The 1966-1967 Turnaround 
In his analysis of British objections to EC membership, Durant con-
eluded that "fear of rising food prices" was "the main reason" for this 
turnaround in public opinion. 16 Dr. Durant bases his conclusion on sur-
vey results showing that 65 percent of those interviewed in Feb~ary, 
1967, and 76 percent in April said that Common Market membership would 
cause food prices to rise. Yet as early as October, 1962, 58 percent 
had been aware of this price of membership. The percentage increase is 
significant, but other attitudinal factors need to be explored. A 
change of lesser magnitude (but of similar proportions) materialized in 
the public's perception of Britain's potential role in the organiza-
tion:17 
If Britain joined the Common Market, do you think she would 
become the leader, would she have to take a back seat to some 
other country, or do you see the Conimon Market as a group in 
which all countries are equal? 
Britain the leader 
All equal 
Britain take back seat 
Don't know 
Sep 
1961 
12 
55 
33 
16 
Apr 
1967 
9 
49 
42 
14 
While a wide majority (80 to 7) supported the idea of "pooling our 
resources to develop atomic energy for peaceful uses," the public was 
18 
not amenable to trading nuclear weapons technology for EC entry. 
16 [Durant,] p. 248. 
17Gallup Poll, Ltd., "British Attitudes Towards the Common Market," 
(Mimeographed, June, 1975), question 68. 
18[ ]. -Durant, p. 24J). 
France might agree to our entry into the Common Market if we, 
in exchange, would agree to sharing with her our nuclear wea-
pons and "know-how." Would you approve of such an agreement 
or not? (November, 1966) 
Approve 30 
Disapprove 51 
Don't know 19 
During the early years of the Common Market the British were willing 
to accept a wide variety of altematives to "going it alone." This lati-
tude had steadily narrowed until the beginning of the first turnaround 
period. But during the turnaround, at least one alternative gained 
strength at Community expense: 19 
If Britain has to join in with other countries in order that 
she may hold her place in the world, would you rather see her 
join with America or with Europe? 
Sep Aug Dec Apr 
1961 1966 1966 1967 
America 36 29 25 29 
Europe 42 55 53 46 
Donvt know 22 26 22 25 
The Gallup organization measured 12 attitudinal dimensions in Feb-
ruary and again in May, 1967. Between the two surveys public support 
for British membership in the EC deteriorated within every dimension: 20 
If Britain does join the European Common Market, which of 
these effects do you think it will have? 
Good effects: 
Give us a wider choice of goods in the shops 
Raise our exports 
Increase the efficiency of our industries 
Make Britain's voice more powerful in 
international affairs 
l9Gallup Poll, (Mimeographed), question 65. 
20[Durant,] p. 235. 
Feb May 
1967 1967 
46 
42 
32 
28 
38 
39 
28 
26 
Raise our standard of living 
Give a chance of going abroad for a job 
Bad effects: 
Raise prices of food 
Take away our political independence 
Cause unemployment 
The Commonwealth will collapse 
Restrict the power of the trade unions 
in wage negotiations 
Reduce the power of Parliament 
22 
20 
65 
20 
17 
14 
13 
10 
19 
20 
76 
22 
21 
22 
18 
18 
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The turnaround trend toward negative opinion on British membership 
continued past April 30, 1967; but that date is used for analysis period 
definition because the probable influence of deGaulle's May 16 press 
conference introduces a significant variable extraneous to t~e purpose 
of this study. Such a disproportionate unknown would result in un-
acceptable distortion in the outcome of the analysis. 
Subsequent to deGaulle's second veto of the British efforts, the 
issue again lapsed into latency. Though the distribution of opinion re-
mained unfavorable, the return of low salience allowed Prime Minister 
Heath's Government to (successfully) negotiate entry on the third British 
attempt. Once the Government and Parliament had approved entry, Com-
munity support temporarily grew to within competitive range of opposi~ 
tion; but after the Community of Nine came into being in January, 1973, 
the compound effects of worldwide inflation and Market support prices 
were probably responsible for returning opinion distribution to the pat-
tern of 1968-1971. 
Increasing inflation, industrial strikes, and worsening unemploy-
ment dominated the economic characteristics of the milieu during Britain's 
~itial transition period into the European Community. For most Britons, 
the Common Market was associated with these economic conditions. 21 
Of all £he outputs of government, good times and bad must be 
among ·those most strongly valued by the mass of the people. 
The material and psychic deprivations of being out of work are 
vivid to those who experience the~as well as to many who only 
observe them in others. Similarly, the consequences of having 
a fatter pay packet or of being on short time or of having to 
contend with higher prices in the mar~et are directly felt by 
those whose lives are touched. Changes of personal economic 
condition are overwhelmingly E;alien~2to the mass and evoke in 
them s~rong and definite attitudes. 
After ~he Conservative Government's resignation, the Labour sue-
cessors responded to the public's increased salience on the Common Mar-
ket issue with a demand for renegotiation of membership terms. In the 
Labour manifesto for the October, 1974 general election was a pledge 
for a referendum on the issue. The campaigning for both the general 
election and for the referendum further increased the issue's salience. 
As was the case with the first turnaround, the price of fGod was 
a dominant factor, but its influence was complicated by numerous other 
attitudinal dimensions. Data for the proximate pre-turnaround period 
are not available, but earl~er data (October, 1972) showed that. 92 per-
cent of the respondents thought EC membership increased the pr~ce of 
food. For uother goods" th'e measure was 69 percent. A plurality of 
44 percent thought the· EC would cause taxes to rise. 23 
On the positive side, pluralities 'felt that membership would be 
beneficial in two economic areas. Fifty-nine percent expected wages 
21Roger ,Jewel and James Spence, ~ Grudgin' Europeans.. ! Study of 
British Attitudes Towards~ EEC (London, 1975 , po 22. 
22Butler and Stokes, p. 390. 
23Gallup Poll (Mimeographed), question 117. 
! 
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to increase; 38 percent anticipated an increase in available jobs. 24 
Non-economic attitudes also were significant in this later tum-
around: Most noteworthy were the more intense feelings associated with 
the Commonwealth and with national sovereignty. Whereas in 1967 only 
14 to 22 percent expressed concern over the Commonwealth status, as 
late as March, 1975, 41 percent indicated that affection for the Common-
wealth tended to reduce their support of the Ec. 25 Many people felt 
that their nation was in danger of being absorbed by the Community, with 
a consequent loss of British sovereignty. Yet at the same time, they 
perceived a need for such an organization in a superpower-dominated 
world. 
On the one hand, there is a strong feeling of identity among 
the public with the British _ethos and with British institutions; 
on the other hand, there is ·a widespread recognition that Bri-
tain depends on other nations for her prosperity and (to a 
lesser extent) her survival. • .~ Most people felt that being 
part of the Common Market wo~ld diminish Britain's capacity for 
self-determination, and reacted negatively to the prospect. 
But they also felt that, unless she was associated with a 
potential world power of the status of the EEC, Britain ~~uld 
have less influence in the world than she ought to have. 
By the end of the turnaround most of the fears had been rationalized; 
I Only six percent remained opposed to membership for reasons based on sov-
ereignty.27 A 39 percent.plurality said that the Coinrnonwealth relation-
! 
I 
24rbid. 
25Ibid. 1 questions 547 11 (h). The two q~estions differed, but the 
contrast still seems valid; in the earlier period the Commonwealth was 
not so highly valued by the public. Six reasons for 1this relative lack 
of af~e~tion were detailed by Roy Lewis, "Commonwealth as Britain's 
Dowry for Europe," The Times (London), February 11, l967, p. 11. 
26 . Jewell and Spence, P• 33· 
27Gallup Poll (Mimeographed), question 3. 
ship would be better with Britain~ ~he Ec. 28 And on the economic 
attitudinal factors, the overall balance of 9pinion favored continued 
membership: 29 
I am going to read out a number of things and I would like you 
to tell me whether you think they would be better if we stay in 
the Common Market or better if we leave the Common Market. 
Better Better Don't 
Same out in know 
The price we pay for food? 21 34 32 12 
The price we pay for 
other goods? 19 27 35 19 
The level of wages? 19 18 42 21 
The level of employment--
that is, the number 
of jobs available? 17 24 41 18 
The general standard 
of living? 17 26 43 14 
The level of taxation? 25 22 23 30 
After the referendum, the Gallup organization used an open-ended 
question to determine the attitudes that structures public opin~on at 
the point of issue resolution, the referendum vote.3° 
What were the main issues or reasons for you voting in the 
way you did? 
"Yes" voters: 
Britain cannot stand alone; unity 
Brita:in' s future ·· · 
No point in leaving 
Other economic reasons 
More jobs 
Prices 
Party leaders were for it 
Best alternative available 
Better food supplies 
Political (unity) reasons 
Stabilize the situation 
28Ibid.~ question 2 (a). 
29Ibid., question 1. 
30ibid.~ question 3· 
27 
20 
17 
13 
5 
3 
3 
3 
2 
2 
2 
Support against Communism 
Other reasons 
"No" voters: 
Prices 
Independence 
Britain better on her own 
General economic reasons 
More jobs 
Trade 
Anti-European 
Other reasons 
Summary 
2 
10 
38 
18 
12 
10 
8 
5 
5 
13 
Though by 1975 the issue had an 18 year history, latency was its 
predominant characteristic for most of that time. During the two periods 
of the public op~ion reversals--in the process of latency activation--
several factors became increasingly important: The perceived or antici-
pated effect on food prices, variety of goods, balance of payments, un-
employment, national sovereignty, and Commonwealth relationships were 
found to be the most salient aspects of British public opinion toward 
the Common Market. 
CHAPI'ER III 
THE BRITISH NATIONAL DAILIES 
The Influence Potential of the Press 
Typical of the statements quoted by Prins in her detailed psycho-
logical study of British attitudes toward the EC is "The press has long 
influenced the affairs in Britain to the point where entry into the EEC 
appears as the only hope to national salvation. 111 If the six national 
dailies samples are typical of the whole press, the statement may be 
somewhat true--though it is an exaggeration of the demonstrable evidence. 
I .'. . I 
Similarly adding to the partial truth, "Mr. Roy Hughes said that every 
mass circulation newspaper had been very much in favor of staying in the 
EEC and they had been using 'distortion and censorship' in pointing out 
the merits of staying in. n 2 
Even if the press had been.totally saturated with pro-Marketeer 
material1 it.s influence ·would have been appreciably less than that posited 
by the disgruntled anti-Marketeers. According to Lazarfeld and Merton, 
monopolization is a requisite condition to optimum media influence--only 
then can the media "exhibit the degree of social power commonly attributed 
I . 
1Miriam Borop Prins, "British Attitudes to the European Economic 
CoiiJ!liUility," Commission of the European Comnrunities Report X/B/5/165/74-
E (Bristol, 1972), P• 65. ' . 
' 2 
"Why Labour Changed Its Mind," Times (London), 12 March 1975, p. 10. 
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i;.o them."3 As will be seen in Chapter IV, monopolization by one side 
was characteristic of neither period. 
That the EC membership issue was foreign policy mig!:tt seem to be a 
limitation on the potential influence of Fleet Street (the self-designa-
tion of the British press), for "the volume of international news is a 
small proportion of total news space in most newspapers, and small in 
absolute terms as well. If little foreign affairs news is published, 
even less is read."4 However, when the issue was activated as a largely 
domestic issue, coverage (and presumably readership) increased. In such 
a situation the influence potential may well have been enhanced by the 
fact that the issue was one of foreign affairs: "Propaganda will be 
more effective • ~ • as it related to matters beyond people's immediate 
ken, though seemingly relevant to their main interests or convictions."5 
As a problem of foreign policy, EC membership was clearly "beyond peoples' 
immediate ken," but each time the issue became activated, it likely 
seemed "relevant to their main interests or convictions" (e.g., the 
price of food, prospects for job security and advancement, and social 
services). The data in the following chapter should lend more confidence 
I 
to an assertion about the nature of the role of the press in:this issue, 
but first, the nature of the British press itself demands consideration. 
3Paul F. Lazarfeld and Robert K. Merton, "Requisite C.onditions for 
Propaganda Success," Voice of the People: Read:i,ngs ,!!! Public Op;inion 
and Propaganda, ed. Reo M. Christenson'and Robert 0. McWilliams (New 
York, 1967), PP• 339-340, 343. , 
~emard c. Cohen, "The Press, The Public and Foreign Policy," 
Reader ,!!! Public O;einion and Comrmmications (2nd ed. , New ~ork; 1966) , 
P• 134· · · 
5charles A. S:j_epmann, "Propaganda Techniques," Voice ..£!: the People: 
Readings ,!!! Public Opinion and Pro~ayanda, ed. Reo M. Christenson artd 
Robert O~ McWilliams (New York, 19 7 , P• 339. 
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The Dailies 
UNESCO in 1964, Manvell in 1966, and Merrill in 1970 all observed 
that large chains dominated Fleet Street. 6 But during the first turn-
around, of the major dailies, only the Daily ~ and Daily Sketch had 
common proprietorship or management. 7 During the more recent turnaround--
' 
after the demise of the Sketch--none of the major national dailies were 
associated with one another. 8 
Discussions of Fleet Street typically classify the publications 
according to two criteria: • poli:tical .leaning and style~ :·.Though British 
papers are not formally affiliated with political parties (with the ex-
ceptions of the Communist Morning Star and Labour's Sunday Citizen), 
they are generally consistent in their respective political positions. 9 
As might be _e~ected, private ownership lends a slight conservative 
political predominance to Fleet Street. Four of the eight major national 
dailies exhibit a definite Conservative bias: The Daily Telegraph, 
Daily Express, Daily~' and Daily Sketch (now out of publication); 
the Daily Mirror and the Sun are Labour supporters; the Guardian's 
position is between the Labour and Liberal Parties; and the Times is 
6united Nations, UNESCO, World Press Newspapers and ~ Agencies 
(Amsterdam, 1964), p. 23; Roger Manvell, This Age of Comrrrunication 
(Glasgow, 1966), pp. 20-21; John c. Merrill, Carter R. Bryan, and Marvin 
Alisky, ~ Foreif, Press:. ! Survey .2£ the World's, Journalism (2nd ed., 
Baton Rouge, 1972 , p. 59. ·. 
7 See "Daily Newspapers of Great Britain and Ireland--Personnel, 
Circulation, Advertising Rates, etc.," Editor and Publisher Yearbook--
1968, ed. Albert E. Weis et al. (New York, 1968'}"; p. 469. 
' ' 
8see "Daily Newspapers of Great Britain and Ireland: Newspapers, 
Circulation, Advertising Rates 1 etc.," Editor and Publisher International 
Yearbook~, ed. Albert E. Weis et al. (New York, 1975), p. 419. 
9Merrill, Bryan and Alisky, p. 62. 
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"less committed" to any party. Though the less ambivalently classi-
fied papers have definite J.nformal alignments, they are frequently criti-
cal of their professed party when it is in power. 
When classified according to style, the Times, Guardian, and Daily 
Telegraph are typed as "quality" papers; the remaining national dailies 
are designated "mass-appeal," or "popular" papers. 11 A natural pre-
sumption would perhaps hold that the more educated higher classes would 
read the quality papers while the working classes would patronize the 
popular press. But Manvell, though admitting that this is generally 
the case, feels that the class correlation is spurious~ 11 The difference 
lies solely in the attitude of the reader to his newspaper~ not in his 
class, social background~ or level of education. 1112 The reader of a 
quality paper does not "merely read11-he studies and reflects on what 
he has read. "The popular papers~ on the other hand, are mainly glance-
read for fun and for the more casual collection of passJ.ng J.nformation. n13 
10David E. Butler and Donald Stokes, Political Change in Britain: 
Forces Shaping Electoral Choice (New York, 1969), pp. 230-231. 
11Allan Delafons, ."1967 Difficult Year for Britain's Press," Editor 
and Publisher International Yearbook--1968, ed. Albert E. Weis et al. 
(New York, 1968), p. 466; Merrill9 Bryan and Alisky., pp. 61-62; Manvell, 
pp. 20-21. 
1~anvell, p. 21 
13Ibid., pp. 20-21. 
TABLE I 
STYLE AND PARTISANSHIP OF 
BRITISH NATIONAL DAILIES 
Daily Partisanship 
Conservative Liberal Labour Non-Comitted 
Quality Papers 
The Times X 
The Daily Telegraph X 
The Guardian 
--x--
Popular Papers 
The Daily Express X 
The Daily Mail X 
The Daily Sketch X 
The Daily Mirror X 
The Sun X 
The Quality Papers 
Of these papers, "the Times is the soberest and the Daily Telegraph 
is the liveliest. 1114 Though probably the best-lmown newspaper in the 
world, the Times encountered fiscal troubles in the early 1960's. Two 
steps ·were taken to increase circulation (and thus, advertising revenue)g 
1~errill~ Bryan, and Alisky, p. 61. 
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In 1965.~he traditionally staid front-page format was replaced by head-
lined news, and in 1966 tne Sunday Times and daily Times were merged. 
These steps were apparently effective~ Circulation immediately increased 
by over 30 percent~ and continued to increase over the next six years. 15 
The Daily Telegra~ has by far the largest circulation of the quality 
papers. 16 Its most noticeable characteristic is an extensive (two to 
six page) business and stock market section usually beginning on page 
two. 
The Guardian (formerly Manchester Guardian) has exhibited the most 
I 
consistent growth of all the major ~ational dailies over,the past few 
years. 17 Its growth may be explained through its uniquely reflective 
support of moderately leftist policies and. by the addition of a remote 
printing facility for the London edition. 
The Popu1ar Papers 
Because the reader of this study is assurr1ed to be less familiar 
with Londonvs "popular press, 11 a. brief description of format is deemed 
a ppropriaije. 
The three popular dailies included in the sample share generally 
the same ~rra.ngem~nt of material: The front-page headlines of the Sun 
and the Daily Mirr~ are bold and sensational~ usually proclaiming 
either scandal, tragedy, or crime. (Only rarely does pure :politics 
receive such prominent coverage.) The Daily Express usually presents 
t5computed. from circulation figures given in Editor and Publisher 
Yearbook editions 1963 through 1974. 
16Ibid. 
17Ibid. 
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a politically relevant front-page story; but typically, a crime headline 
competes for the readers' attention. And in all three of the popular 
papers surveyed~ attention is further diluted by front-page pictures 
highlighting non-political feature stories contained inside the issue. 
The interior pages, in which rather sketchy political news is presented, 
are dominated by human-interest and glamour stories. The 1975-1975 
samples of the Sun boldly appeal to the prurient interests with a daily 
picture of a nude or nea~nude girl on page 3; occasionally, page 7 
presents a similarly clad "Daily Male." The remainder of the shared 
format consists of radio and television programming, classified adve~ 
tisements, and a large sports section. 
Though these papers "provide daily • • • diets of scandal, gossip, 
and.sex-interest to their millions of readers," they do dispense politi-
cal news--and they gain the opportunity to influence public opinion on 
···- - . 
18 political issues, including the one central to the present study. 
The amount of this influence will be directly affected by several fac-
tors, one of which is the extent of circulation. 
Three of the popular papers have experienced a gradual decline 
since 1967. The Daill Mirror maintains the largest circulation of any 
of the British dailies. Even after a decrease of over 800,000 during 
the seven years separating the two turnarounds, the Mirror sold over 
four million copies per day during 1974. The Daily Express and the Daily 
~experienced similar drops, but averaged respectively 3.2 and 1.7 
million copies in 1975. (See Table II.) 
More extreme circulation changes, in opposite directions, were ex-
18Merrill, Bryan, and Alisky, p. 61. 
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hibited by the remaining two major national dailiese The Daily Sketch~s 
circulation was almost one million copies in 1967; in 1974 that paper 
ceased operations. A similar fate was forecast for the ~~ In late 
July7 19699 the Sun was "expected to set, never to rise again. 1119 Meta-
p~orically extended, however, the clouds dissipated and the ~ shines 
more brightly than ever. Circulation was tripled. BW 1974, 3.5 million 
copies per day were publishes. 
Dailx 
Qualitx Papers 
Daily Telegraph 
Times 
Guardian 
Daily Mirror 
Daily E.xpress 
Daily Mail 
Sun 
Daily Sketch 
TABLE II 
AVERAGE DAILY CIRCULATIONS 
1,411,925 
334,142 
288,000 
1,406,699 
339,594 
358,895 
Source~ 11Daily Newspapers of Greati:Britain and Ireland-Personnel, 
Circulations, Rates," Editor and Publisher International Yearbook....:.1968, 
ede Albert E~ Weis et ale (Ne'WYork, 1968), p. 469; "Daily Newspapers-
of Great Britain and Ireland: Newspapers,i Personrtel, Circulatiqn, Ad-
vertising Rates, etc.," Editor and Publisher International Yearbook--
1975, ed. Albert E. Weis et al. --c"New York, 1975), p. 419. · 
19Ibid., p. 67e 
CHAPI'ER. IV 
THE APPARENT RELATIONSHIP BE~~ PUBLIC OPINION 
TOWARD THE EC AND BRITISH NATIONAL DAILIES 
vJhile Chapter II was a discussion of British public opinion toward 
the European Community and Chapter III acquainted the reader with the 
British national dailies, this chapter provides a structured investiga~ 
tion of the relationships between the two. The general hypothesis (that 
public opinion on foreign affairs is determined by the combined influences 
of leadership, policy momentum, qnd the media) will be mdirectly ap-
preached through four specific hypotheses: mere exposure, directional 
bias, content relevancy, and treatment of leaders. 
Mere Exposure 
Strength of support for Common Market membership is directly 
related to the quantity of national daily newspaper coverage 
of the issue. 
Operationalizatiqg 
"Strength of support for Common Market membership" is indicated by 
. 1 
the Gallup findings at the end of each turnaround period. By May, 1967, 
a majority of those responding were against Common Market membership; 
by May of 1975, a similar majority favored British membership. 
1see Figures 2-4, pp. 26-30; also see Appendix A. 
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The "quantity of national daily newspaper coverage of the issue" 
w]ll be measured by the weighted number of lines on the EC or on British 
membership in the organization. 2 
Testing 
As shown in Table III, the data indicate that the readership of the 
British national dailies was exposed to considerably more material during 
the turnaround toward favorable opinion toward Common Market membership. 
Thus, the strength of support for membership and the quantity of cove~ 
age are both lower in the earlier period than in the later period; how-
ever, the increase is probably insufficient for conclusive ~upport of 
the hypothesis of mere exposuree The majority of the increase was found 
in the least circulated papers. Consequently, the _we.ighted factor in-
crease was less than the 50 percent increase specified for hypothesis 
acceptance. The potential for influence through mere exposure was viable, 
but only the "quality paper" portions of the sample demonstrated any 
noticeable :increase in the amount of coverage in the latterp~riod. 
Perhaps the limited amount of space devoted to politics in the formats 
of the "popular papers" places a physical barrier that would severely 
limit this mode of influence on any public issue. 
2weighting computations based on proportionate circulation are pre-
sented in Appendix B. 
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TABLE III 
mESS EXPOSURE OF THE: COMMON MARKET 
1966-1967 Turnaround 1974-1975 Turnaround 
Paper No. Lines Weight Factor No. Lines Weight Factor 
Quality Papers 
Daily Telegraph 2115 .115 243-3 2764 .108 298.5 
Times 1500 .027 40-5 4522 .026 117.6 
Guardian 591 .024 14.2 2118 c028 59-3 
Popular Papers 
Daily Mirror 332 -415 137.8 351 -330 115.8 
Daily Express 814 
-324 263.7 1003 1 -243 243-7 
Sun 497 .095 47.2 386 .265 102.3 
Total 5849 746.7 11144 998e0 
Manifest Bias 
H2 Growth of support for the Common Market is related to the 
pro-Market bias in 1975 newspaper coverage; diminution of 
support is related to the anti-Market bias in the 1967 
coverage. 
Operationalization 
Direction of bias in manifest content was assessed for each article 
in the sample, using five of Doob's seven bias criteria:3 
3Leonard W. Doob, Public Opinion and Propaganda (2nd ed., Hamden, 
Conn., 1966), P• 433. 
1. On what page and in which position does the story appear? 
2. What is the size of the headline and what impression does 
it give? 
3· What impression does the lead--the first sentence or para-
graph-give? 
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4. What statements are presented as though they were uncontested 
facts? 
5. From what phrases, if any, .is it possible to deduce the bias 
•. • • of the reporter or editor? 
The two excluded criteria would have duplicated aspects examined in 
another of the hypotheses. 
The preponderance of manifest bias was found through application 
of the second, third, and fifth criteria; only the Daily Express demon-
strated the fourth criterion; and no use of the first technique was noted 
in the sample. The articles were coded as follows: 
Testing 
+1 for each article favorable to the EC, 
0 for each neutral article, and 
-1 for each article deleterious to the EC. 
The unweighted data were arranged in a two by three table for the 
Chi square test. The pro-Market bias exhibited during the more recent 
turnaround was shown to be significantly greater (df = 2, N = 184, 
p (.001). As shown in Table IV, the summated score for each newspaper 
was weighted by relative circulation, and the total weighted scores were 
compared for each turnaround. Gamma was computed and found to be +.57, 
which :indicates an increase of 57 percent in the pro-Market bias in the 
later period. 
(+) 
Paper Pro 
-
Quality Papers 
Daily Telegraph 8 
Times 2 
Guardian 2 
Popular Papers 
Daily·Mirror 2 
Daily Express 0 
Sun 6 
Total 20 
TABLE IV 
MANIFEST BIAS IN THE PRESS 
1966-1967 Turnaround 
(o) (-) 
Neutral A.."lti 
10 3 
10 4 
5 2 
3 1 
3 7 
1 0 
32 17 
Sum Wt. Factor 
-
+5 .115 +0.575 
-2 .027 -0.054 
0 .024 0 
+1 -415 +0.415 
-7 -324 -2.268 
+6 .095 +0.570 
-0.762 
(+) 
Pro 
-
11 
12 
I 8 
1 
11 
6 
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1974-1975 Turnaround 
(0) 
Neutral 
14 
18 
14 
5 
3 
1 
55 
(-) 
.Anti 
4 
3 
3 
0 
1 
0 
11 
Sum Wt. Factor 
+7 .108 -t0-756 
+9 .026 +0.234 
+5 .028 +0.140 
+1 -330 +0.330 
+10 •243 +2e430 
+6 .265 +1.590 
+5-480 
\J1 
+-
Content Relevancy 
The direction of opinion at the end of each period corres-
ponds to the direction of relevant arguments relayed by the 
press during the turnaround; i.e., of the arguments relayed 
by the press, the anti-Market rationale will be found more 
predominent in 1966-67; the pro-Market rationale will be 
found more predominant in 1974-75. 
Ope rationalization 
Relevant arguments are th~se which correspond to the attitudes 
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found in the Gallup probes at the end of each turnaround. All articles 
explicitly relaying a relevant argument factor were included, whether 
editorial or news report. 
Test::!ng 
Four separate arguments are formed by the Gallup response groups. 
These constitute the pro and anti-Market arguments for each period 
scored in this hypothesis. Each press relay of an argument factor was 
coded~ 
+1 for support of the factor's contention, and 
-1 for argwi!ent against the factor's contention. · 
There were~ of course, varying degrees of assertion intensity and credi-
__ bility encountered in the. articles; but to better preserve the inter-
subjectivity of the coding process, simply nominal classifications were 
used. 
Tab],.e V shows the relevancy contributions found in the sample. The 
two by two Chi square test indicates that the move toward pro-Market 
bias in the second turnaround was statistically significant (df Q 1, 
N = 103, p <.001). 
For each factor, the sum of each paper's code score was first 
I 
weighted by circulation. Next, the stun of the·se initially weighted 
scores was weighted by relevancy degree. The relevancy degree weights 
were derived from the percentages of respondents designating each factor 
as a main determinant in their directional opinion on the issue. Gallup 
permitted multiple and DK ("don't lmow") responses, but for comparisons, 
conversion was made to 100 percent:4 
1966-1967~ 
Membership Sup~o~ Factors 
Raise our exports 
Wider choice of goods in shops 
Increase ·efficiency of industries 
Make Britain's voice more powe~ 
ful in L~ter.national affairs 
Chance to go abroad for a job 
Raise our standard of living 
Membership Opposition F~ctors 
Raise prices of food 
Take away our political 
independence 
The Commonwealth will collapse 
Cause unemployment · 
Restrict power of trade unions 
:in wage negotiations · · · 
Reduce power o.f Parliament 
1974-1975~ 
Membership Support Factors 
I 
Britain carmot stand alone;. 
[international] unity 
Britain's future · 
No point in le~ving 
Other [gen~ral] econ6mic reasons 
More jobs .; 
Gallup 
Percentage 
39 
38 
28 
26 
20 
19 
170 
76 
22 
22 
21 
18 
18 
177 
27 
20 
17 
13 
5 
Converted 
Percentage 
23 
22 
17 
15 
12 
11 
100 
43 
12! 
12! 
"12 
10 
10 
100 
28 
20 
17 
13 
5 
4The question stems used by Gallup may be found in Chapter II. The 
1967 and 1975 questions are quite different, but they do, elicit similar 
information: Expressed are the attitude-set components that contributed 
to (or resulted from rationalization o.f) pro or anti-Market opinions on 
the membership issue. · · 
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Prices 3 3 
Party leaders were for it 3 3 
Best alternative available 3 3 
Better food supplie~ 2 2 
[Domestic] poli~ical (unity) 
reasons 2 2 
Stabilize the situation 2 2 
Support against Communism 2 2 
99 100 
Membership Opposition Factors 
Prices 38 40 
Independence, sovereignty 18 19 
Britain better on her own 12 18 
General economic reasons 10 10 
More jobs 8 8 
Trade 5 5 
Anti,-Europea11 5 5 
9b roo 
The data presented in Table V support the hypothesis for both 
periods: Dur::lng the 1966-1967 turnaround, which culminated in public 
opposition to Common Market membership, the papers sampled relayed more 
relevant arguments prejudicial to than supportive of the organization; 
during the later turnaround, the samples showed more favorable than dele-
terious arguments. Yule v s Q as computed from the weighted data is • 92. 
This means that 92'percent of the difference in bias may be statistically 
' ' attributable to the hypothesized bias change between the two time periods. 
Paper 
Daily Telegraph 
Times 
Guardian 
TABLE V 
CONTENT RELEVANCY 
1966-67 Argument Factors 
Pro-Market1 Anti-Market 
No. Score No. Score 
1 
2 
2 
2.645 5 
0.932 0 
0.852 2 
14.203 
0 
o.6oo 
1974-75 Arsument Factors 
Pro-Marketl Anti-Market 
No. Score· , No. Score 
7 
21 
11 
10.36B 4 
5.226 7 
4· 900 11 
5-724 
3.926 
4.900 
TABLE V (CONTINUED) 
Paper 
1966-67 Argument Factors 
Pro-Market1 Anti-Market 
No. Score No. Score 
Daily Mirror 0 
Daily Express 1 
Sun 0 
b 
0 0 
3·340 9 
0 1 
'="'7.~76~9 17 
0 
62.792 
1.187 
78.782 
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1974-75 Argument Factors 
Pro-Market1 Anti-Ma::ket 
No.. Score:. No. Score 
2 
9 
2 
55 
10.560 0 
33.777 2 
10.865 1 
75.695 25 
0 
7.100 
10.600 
32.250 
1Weighted by circulation and converted Gallup percentages. See 
text. 
Treatment of Leaders 
H4 The drop in Common Market support in 1966-67 is related to 
more favorable press coverage given to anti-Market leaders; 
the growth in Community support in 1974-75 is related to 
more favorable coverage of pro-Market leaders. 
Operationalization 
Those well-know.n leaders who professed a definite, unqualified 
position on the issue are considered as the anti-Marketeer and pro-
Marketeer leaders in the context of this hypothesis •. For 1966-1967, the 
designated pro-Marketeers are Heath, Thorpe, Callaghan, and Brown; the 
anti-Marketeer leaders are Perkins, Powell, Jay, Peart, Crossman, and 
Shinwell. For the 1974-1975 period, the designated pro-Marketeers are 
R. Jenkins, S. Williams, Thatcher, Thorpe, Whitelaw, and Short; the 
anti-Marketeers are Benn, Powell, Shore, and Foot. 
The "press coverage given to" the leaders includes all the press 
communications included in the papers, whether related to the Common 
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~arket issue or ~at. This broad field of evidence is demanded by Tannen-
ba1.l.lll's "Mediated Generalization" theory on which the hypothesis is based. 5 
However, a caveat is necessary: Only when the leader's name appeared 
in an article title, or when the subject was the EC, or in an editorial 
was the comment coded. 
Testing 
All comments referring directly to the leaders were scored: 
+1 for a positive comment on a pro-Marketeer, 
-1 for a negative comment on a pro-Marketeer, 
-1 for a positive comment on an anti-Marketeer, and 
+1 for a negative comment on an anti-Marketeer. 
The two by two Chi square test showed that the shift to pro-Market 
support in this dimension was statistically significant. The hypothesis 
is supported ( df = 1, N = 55, p ( • 001). Each paper' s scores were 
weighted for circulation. Yule's Q showed 96 percent of the dimensional 
difference to be explained by the hypothesis. 
5Percy H. Tannenbaum, "Mediated Generalization of Attitude Change 
via the Principle of Congruity," Readings ,!!! Attitude Change, ed. Samuel 
Himmelfarb and Alice H. Eagly {New York, 1974), pp. 210-217. 
TABLE VI 
TREATMENT OF LEADERS BY NATIONAL DAILIES 
1966-1967 1974-1975 
Paper +P -P +A -A Score Weight Product +P -P +A ;_A Score Wei~ht Product 
Daily Telegraph 0 1 0 1 0 .115 0 2 0 1 8 +9 .108 .+0.972 
Times 1 0 0 0 +1 .027 +0.027 2 2 0 1 +1 .026 +0.026 
Guardian 1 0 0 1 +2 .024 +0.04$ 2 1 1 4 +4 .028 +0.112 
Daily Mirror 0 0 0 0 0 .415 0 3 2 0 3 +4 -330 +1.34:> 
Daily Express 0 5 1 0 -6 -324 -1.944 1 0 0 4 +5 ·243 +1. 215 
Sun 0 0 0 1 +1 .095 +0.095 1 0 0 5 +6 • 265 +1.590 
Total 2 6 1 3 -1.774 11 5 2 25 +5.235 
Legend: +P = positive comments on pro-Marketeers 
-P = negative comments on pro-Marketeers 
+A = positive comments on anti-Marketeers 
-A = negative comments on anti-Marketeers 
g-
CHAPI'ER V 
CONCLUSION 
Press Bias 
The measures of bias showed the British national dailies to be 
divided in the earlier turn13_round period. However, the widely read "pop-
ular papers" (particularly the Daily Express) were generally indicated 
to be more anti-Market while the "quality press" was largely pro-Market. 
Consequently, the press bias for the 1966-1967 turnaround weighs in the 
anti-Market direction. In the later period, the evidence is overwhelmingly 
that the papers were strongly supportive of British membership. Table 
VII shows that though the measures are more often in agreement than not, 
th~y are not interchangeable. 
More precise examination of the compatibility of measures is derived 
through application of "Kendall's Coefficient of Concordance: W." This 
test of multiple rankings was applied to the papers of each period to 
determine both the significance of and degree of correlation between 
measures. 
The rankings from which the coefficient was computed are detailed in 
Table VIII. E_a_c:h. paper .is ran~ed for each period. A rank of one indi-
cates the most pro-Market paper and a rank of twelve indicates the most 
anti-Market oneG 
Kendall's test was applied in twq ways: First, all four hypotheses' 
rankings were included. The findings were statistically significant at 
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the .05 level. Next, the unaccepted hypothesis, H1 (mere exposure) was 
excluded. This raised the level of significance to .02. 
As is shown in the "average rank" column, six of the seven most pro-
Market papers were from the period of tur.naround toward favorable public 
opinion, while the opposite is the case with the remaining papers. In 
compar:tng the two tur.naround periods, one finds the later period to have 
more press exposure of the EC (though not at the specified levels), more 
positive manifest bias, more relevant pro-Market rationale, and more 
favorable treatment accorded to pro-Market leaders. The data thus demon-
strate the posited correlation between newspaper bias and public o.p~ion 
toward British membership in the European Community. 
TABLE VII 
NOMINAL BIAS DISTRIBUTION 
1966-1967 1974-1975 
Pa:eer H2 H3 H4 H 2 H3 H4 
Daily Telegraph Pro ~ .Anti Neutral Pro Pro Pro 
Times Anti . Pro Pro Pro Pro Pro 
Guardian Neutral Neutral Pro Pro Neutral Pro 
Daily Mirror Pro Neutral Neutral Pro Pro Pro 
.. 
Daily Express Anti ~'Anti Anti Pro Pro Pro 
Sun Pro Anti Pro Pro Pro Pro 
PaEer 
Daily Telegraph 
Times 
Guardian 
Daily Mirror 
Daily Express 
Sun 
TABLE VIII 
CORRELATION OF MEASURES 
Issues I\ H2 
1966-67 3 6.5 
1974-75 2 3 
1966-67 4 11 
1974-75 1 2 
1966-67 8 10 
1974-75 6 6.5 
1966-67 12 8.5 
1974-75 11 8.5 
1966-67 7 12 
1974-75 5 1 
1966-67 9 4-5 
1974-75 10 4-5 
The Effect of the Bias 
Average 
H3 H4 . Rahk 
11 10.5 7-5 
3 1 2.3 
4 8 6.8 
2 8 3·3 
6 6 7-5 
8.5 4-5 6.3 
8.5 10.5 9.9 
5 4-5 7-3 
12 12 10.8 
3 3 2.5 
8 8 7-9 
2 2 5.9 
In testing the specific hypotheses, only correlations were sought. 
Yet that does not satisfy the three conditions of causality. 1 Beyond 
covariation, a causal inferrence requires that the proposed explanation 
must not be illogical. The "power of the press" has been widely debated: 
T. S. Matthews, a former editor of~' has said that "there is rio tan-
gible evidence" of the press's power to mold public opinion; "It's 
1Earl R. B~bbie, The Practice of Social Research (Belmont, Ca., 
1975), PP~ 370-371. 
vaunted might is a gigantic spoof. 112 Yet the opposite viewpoint is often 
convincingly set forth. 3 That press bias may change public opinion is 
not illogical. The first pre:t:'equisite for a causal relationship is met. 
The second require~ent for causality is that of temporality; i.e., 
the posited cause must precede the effect. The first halves of each 
paper's samples for each turnaround period were published prior to the 
public o~inion changes. If these portions support the directional hy-
potheses, then the time relationship is established. As shown in Table 
IX, such is the case. The second prerequisite of causality is met. 
"The third requirement is that the observed empirical relationship 
cannot be 'explained away' as being due to the influence of some third 
varia~le that causes both of them. n4 This criterion cannot be fully 
satisfied in the present study. Recall that the general hypothesis 
posits that public opinion on foreign affairs is determined by the com-
b~ed influences of leadership, policy momentum, and media bias. Fu~ 
ther elaboration of this hypothesis in the context of this particular 
issue, British membership in the Community, will serve to determine the 
limits that the third causality criterion places on the findings of this 
study. 
There are 25 possible combinations of contributj,ng, s'lli'fic~ent, and 
intervening causes under the hypothesis; but logical refinement of 
2Quoted in Reo M. Christenson and Robert 0. McWilliams, eds., Voice 
.£f ~ PboYle: Readings 2:!! Public Opinion~ Propaganda, 2nd ed. (New 
York, 19 7 , P• 116. 
3walter Lippmann, Public Opinion, Free Press Paperback ed., (New 
York, 1965), pp. 139 ff.; Charles A. Siepmann, "Propaganda Techniques," 
Voice E.f ~ People: Readings ,!!! Public Opinion ~ Propaganda, ed. Reo 
M. Christenson and Robert 0. McWilliams (New York, 1967), PP• 332-333· 
~abbie, p. 370. 
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"policy momentum" will reduce the number of possible combinations to 16: 
The concept of policy momentum refers exclusively to the strength ac-
quired by a given policy over time. Media and leadership variables can 
influence (and conceivably even make) policy, but they cannot cause 
policy momentum. Thus, policy momentum cannot serve as an intervening 
variable. 
TABLE IX 
EARLY roRTIONS OF THE SAMPLE 
Anti Neutral Pro 
19b6-67 5 20 8 2 
H2 X = 11.55, 
1974-75 2 29 21 P<s01 
1966-67 6 2 2 H X = 18.86, 
- J--1974-7 5 3 17 p (.001 
1966-67 3 1 2 
H4 X = 12e33t 
1974-75 1 20 p <.001 
Fourteen of the remaining sixteen sequential combinations of in-
fluences can be discounted in the present study for two reasons: First, 
the policy momentum influence was opposite to the direction of public 
opinion for ten of the eighteen years covered by the trend history in 
Chapter II. In this case, policy momentum cannot be considered a suf-
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ficient cause. Secondly, the leadership factor has been shown constant; 
it cannot be a cause. 
The two remaining plausible sequences are: 
(1) media bias 4 opinion change 
media bias 
(2) ~opinion change 
policy momentum 
The data produced in this study cannot further narrow_th~ causal _plausi-
bilities, but the preceding elaboration of t~e general hypothesis indi-
cates that media bias must have contributed significantly--as either a 
sufficient, an interv~ning, or a partial cause-to the two .. cJ:lai?:eses in 
British public opinion toward the European Community. 
Limitations 
Note that the preceding analysis did not_constitute a test of the 
general hypothesis. Because of the cre~ibility of the sources from which 
it was compiled--and its consequent face validity--it was accepted as a 
reasonable basis from which to work in defining the role of the media in 
' the turnaroundse The correlations found in Chapter IV and the elabora-
tion above infer support for the general hypothesis, but only in one of 
its three independent variables. And that support rests on the assump-
tion of media interdependence. This assumption furnishes the_ sole 
available method to (1) assess the media influence as a whole, and (2) 
to infer any degree of causality to the British nation~l dailies in the 
context of this study. 
The general hypothesis itself rests on the assumption that though 
objective extema;t ~vepts may influence public opinion on foreigq. affairs 
as on other issues, such events are sufficiently remote from the public 
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cons~iou~ess that they can only stimulate opinion changes through the 
hypothesized variables. Nevertlieless, it is conceivable that catastro-
phic events could directly affect public opinion. 
Finally, though three of the specific correlational hypotheses were 
supported at a high level of confidence, in the larger context, this 
study must be viewed as no more than a comparative analysis of two iso-
lated :instances. From such a perspective, two cases would be sufficient 
neither to accept nor to reject the general hypothesis. 
Suggested Future Study 
The rather extensive limitations qn acceptance of the general hy-
' pothesis emphatically indicate the need for further research in this 
area. Simultaneous observation of the three posited indepffi1:~ent vari-
ables (policy momentum, leadership, and media) should be correlated to 
the dependent variable (foreign affairs public opinion) to study their 
relative effects. 
Such a study would be feasible with an issue opinion trend history 
similar to that compiled in the prese~t . st11dy. Types of changes in the 
independent var~ables could then be observed in one period of the trend 
history, noting the response of public opinion to varying combinations 
of influences .categories of change and relative weighting might be in-
duced from the initial observation period. The categories and weights 
could then be tested throug;h postdiction in the remainder of the trend 
history. This procedure would provide a valuable test of the gerJ.eral 
hypothesis; and if several such tests were to be conducted on foreign 
affairs issues of varying natures and in different cultures, the general 
hypothesis could be developed into a valuable tool in understanding and 
predicting changes in public opinion on questions of foreign. affairs •. 
A SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Allott, Philip. "Brita:in and Europe." · Journal .£f. Common Market Studies, 
XIII (1975), PP• 203-223. 
"All Renegotiated and Nowhere to Go." The Economist, CCLV, No. 6867 
(1975), PP• 33-34~ ---
Almond, Gabriel A. The American People and Foreign Policy. New York: 
Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1950. 
Almond, Gabriel A., anc3, _Sidney Verba. The Civic Culture. Pr:inceton: 
Pr:inceton University Press, 1963. 
Armand, Louis, and Michael Drancourt. The European Challenge. Tr. 
Patrick Evans. New York: Athenaeum, 1970. 
Babbie, Earl R. The Practice of Social Research. Belmond, Ca.: 
Wadsworth Publish:ing Company, 1975. 
Banfield, Edward c. Political Influence. New York: The Free Press of 
. Glencoe, 1961. 
Barl:ing7 Lome. "Majority 'Want to Stay :in EEC'. 11 
(London), November 11, 1974, p. 1. 
The F:inancial Times 
-
Berelson7 Bernard, and Morris Janowitz. 
Communications. 2nd ed. New York: 
Reader in Public Op:inion and 
The Free Press, 1966. 
Bethoud, Ro~e.r, et al. "The Times Guide to the EEC Referend~. 11 
Times (London), May 19, 1975, pp. I-IV. 
The 
"British Business is Massively for Europe." The Economist, CCLV, Noe 
6873 (1975), PP• 44-45e · ---
Bryce~ James. "The Nature of Public Op:inion." Reader 1:!! Public Op:inion 
and Conimunication. 2nd ed. New York: The Free Press, 1966, PP• 
13-19. 
Butler, David E., and Anthony King. The British General Election£! 
1966. New York: St. Mart :in's Press, 1966. 
Butler, David E., and Michael P:into-Dusch:insky. ~ British General 
Election of 1970. London: The Macmi~lan Press, Ltd., 1971. 
Butler, David E., and Donald Stokes. 
Forces Shaping Electoral Choice. 
1969. 
Political Changes in Britain: 
New York: St. Martin's Press, 
Campbell, Angus, and George Belknap. "Political Party Identification 
and Attitudes Toward Foreign Policy." Public Opinion Quarterly, 
XV (1951), 601-623. 
Campbell, Angus, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. 
69 
Stokes. ~American Voter. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1960. 
Childs, Harwood L. Public Opinion: Nature, Formation ~ RoleG 
Princeton: D. Van Nostrand, 1965. 
Christenson, Reo M., and Robert 0. McWilliams, eds. Voice of the People: 
Readings in Public Opinion and Propaganda. 2nd ed. New York: 
McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1967. 
Cohen, Bernard c. ~ Press and Foreign. Policy. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1963. 
Converse, Philip E. "Some Priority Variables in Comparative Research." 
Electoral Behavior~ ! Comparative Handbook. Ed. Richa~ Rose. 
New York: The Free Press, 19747 pp. 727-745. 
Daily Express (London), 1 December 1966-30 April 1967, 1' December 1974-
30 April 1975 (Washington: Library of Congress Photoduplication 
Service, n.d.). 
Daily Mirror (London), 1 December 1966-30 April 1967, 1 December 1974~ 
30 April 1975 (London: Microfilm Service, Daily Mirror New9papers, 
Ltd., n.d.). 
"Daily Newspapers· of Great Britain and Ireland: Newspapers, Personnel, 
Circulation, Advertising Rates, etc." Editor and Publisl!ler ~ · · 
International Yearbook-1975. Ed. Albert E. Wise · et al. ·• New York: 
Editor and Publisher Co., 1975, ppo 418-421. 
"Daily Newspapers.of Great Britain and Ireland-Personnel, Circulations, 
Rates. 11 Editor· and Publisher International Yearbook-1968~ Ed. 
Albert E. Wise e~l. New York: Editor and Publisher-co7, 1968, 
PP• 467-470. 
I 
Daily Telegraph (London), 1 December 1966-30 April 1967, 1 December 1974-
30 April 1975 (London: British Library Reference Division Repro-
graphic Servi~e, n.d.). 
Delafons, Allan. 111967 Difficult Year for, ~ritain's Press." Editor and 
Publisher International Yearbook--1968. Ed. Albert E. Wise et alG : 
New York: The Editor and Publisher Co., 1968, PP• 466-467. 
"British Press Review-1974." Editor and Publisher Inte!'-
national Yearbook--1975. Ed. Albert E. Wise et al. New York: The 
Editor and Publishe~., 1975, pp. 415-418. 
Doob, Leonard W. Public Opiniod and Propaganda. 2nd ed. Hamden, 
Conn.~ Archon Books, 1966. 
70 
"Do Your Own Referendum Thing." ~ Economist, CCLV, Noe 6876 (1975), 
PP• 16-17. 
[Durant, Henry~] "Public Opinion and the EEC." 
· Market Studies, VI (1968), pp. 231-249. 
Journal of Common 
- ...;..;......-,_ 
Eagly, Alice H., and Kathleen Telaak. "Width of the Latitude of Accept-
ance as a Determinant of Attitude Change." Readings :in Attitude 
Change. Ed. Samuel Himmelfarb and Alice H. Eagly. New York: John 
Wiley and Sons, 1974, pp. 459-470. 
"EEC Referendum. " The Times (London) , May 1, 197 5 ~ pp. 4-5. 
European Community. Commission of the European Co~ities. 
Barometer No. 1, April-May 1974." Brussel, July, 1974. 
graphed.) · · · 
"Euro-
(Mimeo-
European Community. Commission of the European Comrrrunities. "Euro-
Barometer No. 2, October-November 1974." Brussels, December, 1974. 
(Mimeographed. ) · · · · 
European Community. Commission of the European Communitiese "Europe 
as the Europeans See It." (SEC [73] 4584), Brussels, November 27, 
1973. (Mimeographed.) 
Eysenck., H. J. "Are Opinion Polls Adequate? 10 Encounter, XXIV, No. 2 
(1965), PP• 53-55. 
Feld, Werner J., and John K. Wildgen. "Electoral Ambitions and European 
Integration. n International Organization~ XXIX (1975)~ 447-468. 
Forester~ Tom~ "The Opinion Poll Industry." New Statesman, LXXXVIII 
. (1974), P• 454. ---
Funkhouser,. G. Ray. "The Issues of the Sixties: An Exploratory Study 
in the Dynamics of Public Opinion." Public Opinion Quarterly, 
XXXVII (1973)~ PP• 62-75. 
Gallup Poll, Ltd. "British Attitudes to the EEC 1960-63." Journal of 
Common Market Studies, V (1966), pp. 49~61. -
• "British Attitudes Towards the Common Market." London, 
---=J~un-e-,~19·75. (Mimeographed.) 
Gre'at Britain. British Information Services. 11EEC~ Preparations for 
a Possible Referendume" (Policy Statement 8/75), January 20, 2975. 
(Mimeographed.) 
"EEC~ Proposals for Referendum." (Policy Statem~t 
11/75), January 23, 1975. (Mimeographed.) 
71 
"Europe: British Membership." (Policy Statement 44/75), 
June 9, 1975. (Mimeographed.) 
• "European Comrinmity Renegotiations: The Will to Succeed." 
--=(P:--o'="'lJ:-.. c-yStatement 1/75), Janua_ry 7, 1975· (Mimeographed.) 
Great Britain. Central Office of Information. ·British Membership of 
.the European Community (R5940/73), January, 1973. 
"Growing Hostility to· EEC D::l.sclosed by Times-ITN Poll." The Times 
(London), June 7, 1?73, P• 1. 
Guardian (Manchester), 1 December 1966-30 April 1967, 1 December 1974-30 
April 1975 (London~. University Microfilms, Ltd., n.d.). 
Haas, Ernst B. ~ Unit~ £! Europeg Political, Social and Economic 
Forces. Stanford, Ca.: Stanford University Press, 1958. 
Habiby, Raymond N. Oklahoma State University, Stillwater, Oklahomaa 
Lecture, 11 July 1975. 
Hedges, Barry, and Roger Jewell. Britain and the EEC: Report ..2!! ~ 
Survey of Attitudes Towards the European EcOnomic . Community. 
London: Social and Community Plannirig Research, "1971. 
Hennessy, Bernard c. Public Opinion. 3rd ed. North Scituate, Ma.: 
Duxbury Press, 1975. 
Herring, Pendleton. "The Value of Public Opinion as a Social Myth." 
Voice £f the People3 Readings in Public Opinion and Propaganda. 
2nd ed. Ede Reo M@ Christenson and Robert 0. McWilliams. New York~ 
McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1967, PP• 47-49. 
Holstii Ole R. Content Analysis for ~ Social Sciences and Humanitiese 
Reading, Ma.~ Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 1969~ 
Hovland, Carl I., Arthur A. Lumsda:ine, and Fred D. Sheffield. "The 
Effects of Presenting 'One Side' versus 'Both Sides' iri. Changing 
Opinions on a Controversial Subject." The Process and Eff'i6cts of 
Mass Communication. Revised ed. Ed. Wilbur Schramm~d Donald-p. 
Roberts. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1971, pp. 467-4S4. 
Huxley, Aldous. "Notes on Propaganda." Voice .2£ the People: Readings 
~ Public Opinion ~ Propaganda. 2nd ed. Ed. Reo M. Christenson 
and Robert 0. McWilliams. New York: McGraw-Hill.Book Co., 1967, 
PP• 322-330. 
Inglehart, Ronald. "Changing Value Priorities and European Integration." 
Journal of Common Market Studies, X (1971), pp. 1-36. 
---:-::--"""'=~-· "Cognitive Mobilization and European Identity." Compara-
tive Politics, III (1970), PP• 45-70. 
72 
--"""="'-=---· "An End to European Integration?" American Political 
Science E,eyiew, LXI (1967), 764-795. 1 
• "The New Europeans~ Inward or Outward-Looking?" Inte~ 
---n-a":""t1-:-. o-n-al_ Organization, XXIV (1970), pp. 129-139. 
Jewell, Roger, and James Spence. ~ Grudgmg Europeans: ! Study of 
British Attitudes Toward the EEC. London: Social and Community 
Planning Research, 1975. ------
Kelman, Herbert c., and Alice H. Eagly. "Attitude Toward the Communi-
cator, Perception of Communication Content, and Attitude Change." 
Readings in Attitude Change. Ed~ Samuel Himmelfarb and Alice H. 
Eagly. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1974, pp. 173-190. 
Kitzinger~ Uwe W. "Europe: The Six and the Seven." International 
Organization, XIV (1960), pp. 20-36. 
Klapper, Joseph T. The Effects of Mass Communication. New York: The 
Free Press of Glencoe, 1960:-----
Kriesberg, Martin. "Dark Area of Ignorance." Public Opinion and Foreign 
Policy. Ed. Lester Markel. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1949, 
PP• 49-64. 
Lane, Robert E., and David 0. Sears. Public Opinion. Englewood Cliffs, 
N. J.~ Prentice-Hall~ Inc., 1964. 
Lasswell, Harold D. Democracy Through Public Opinion. (Location not 
given): George Banta Publishing Company, 1941. 
Lasswell, Harold D. "The Structure and Function of Communication in 
Society. 11 Reader in Public O~inion ~ Communication. 2nd ed. 
New York~ The Free ·Press, 19b7 pp. 178-189. · 
Lazarfeld, Paul F., Bernard Berelson~ and Hazel Guadet •. ~People's 
Choice~ How ~ Voter Makes QE ~ Mind 1::!! _!! Presidential·· Campaign. 
New Yorkg Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1944. 
• 11Time of Final Decision." Reader in Public O~inion and 
The Free-press, 196 , PP• ~ --...,...--..,. Communication. 2nd ed. New York~ 
117. 
Lazarfeld, Paul F., and Robert K. Merton. "Requisite Conditions for 
Propaganda Success. " Voice of ~ Peopleg Readings ~ Public 
Opinion and Propaganda. 2nd ed. Ed. Reo M. Christenson and Robert 
0. McWilliams. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1967, pp. 339-343. 
Lee, Alfred McClung. B£!~ Understand Propaganda. New York~ Rinehart 
and Co. , 1952. 
Leonard, R. L. 
1968. 
Elections in Britain. 
-
Londom D. Van Nostrand Co. Ltd.~ 
Levine, Samuel, and Freeman F. Elzey. ! Programmed Introduction to 
Research~ Belmont, Ca.: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1968. 
Lewis, Roy. ''Commonwealth as Brita:inv s Dowry for Europe." The Times 
(Lo~don), February 11, 1967, p. 11. ---
73 
Lindberg, Leon N., and Stuart A. Schiengold. Europe's Would-Be Polity • 
. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970. 
Lippmann, Walter. "The Failure of Public Opinion in Foreign Affairse" 
Voiceof the People: Readings~ Public Opinion~ Propaganda& 
2nd ed. Ed. Reo M. Christenson and Robert 0. McWilliams. New York: 
McGraw-Hill Book Co. , i1967, pp8 615-621. 
---=--~-· Public Opinion. 
Free Press, 1965. 
Free Press Paperbook ed. New Yorkz 
I 
The 
Manvell, Roger. ~ Age of Comnrunication. Glasgow: Blackie and Son, 
1966. 
Markel, Lester. "Opinion-A Neglected Instrument." 
Foreign Polic~. Ed. Lester Markel. New York~ 
1949, PP• 3-4 • 
Public Opinion and 
Harper and Brothers, 
Merrill, John c., Carter R. Bryan, and Marvin Alisky. The Foreign Press: 
! Survey of the World's Journalism. 2nd ed. Baton Rough: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1972. 
Merritt, Richard L.~ and Donald J. Puchala, eds. Western European 
Perspectives .£!! International Affairs. New York: Praeger, 1968. 
"TheMomingAfter." ~Economist, CCLV, No. 6276 (1975), pp. 11-12. 
M~wat, R. c. Creating~ European Comnrunity. New York: Barnes and 
Noble, 1973. 
Nutting, Anthony. Europe Will~~~ New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 
1960. . 
110ne Year After~ Still Hopeful. " The. Economis't, CCIL7 No. 6801 (1973) , 
PP• 37-39. 
Osgood, Charles E •. "Coguitive Dynamics in the Conduct of Human Affairs." 
Public Opinion Quarterly, XXIV (1960), pp. 341-365. · . 
Osgood, Charles E., George J. Suci, and Percy H. Tannenbaum. ~Measure­
~ of Meanin_g. ·Urbana: .University of Illinois Press, 1957. 
Osgood, Charles E., and Pei-cy H. Tannenbaum •. "The Principle of Congruity 
in the Prediction of Attitude Change." Psychological Review,, LXII . 
(1955), PP• 42:...55. 
"The Perfect Rysult." ~ Economist, CCLV, No. 6877 (~ 975), I>P• 18-2L 
74 
Pfaltzgraff, Robert L. Britain Faces EuroEee Philadelphia: University 
of Pennsylvania Press, 1969. 
Pinder, John, ed. 
for Britain. 
~Economics.£! EuroEe: What~ Common Market Means 
London~ International Publications Service, 1971. 
Prescott, Daniel Alfreds Education and International Relations: .!, Stud_;y; 
of Education. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1930. 
Prins, Miriam Borop. "British Attitudes. to the European Economic Com-
munity." Commission of the Europea.D Comnrunities, Report X/13/5/ 
165/74-E. Bristol: University of Bristol, October, 1972. (Mimeo-
graphed.) 
nThe Pros Go Up and Up$ 11 Tl:'~ Economist, CCLV, No® 6874 (1975), P• 34. 
Puchala, Donald J. "The Common Market and Political Federation in 
Western European Public Opinion." International-studies Quarterly, 
XIV (1970), PP• 32-59. 
Rose, Richard. "Britain: Simple Abstractions and Complex Realities." 
Electoral Behavior: ! ComEarative Handbook. Ed. Richard E0 Rose. 
New York: The Free Press, 197 4, pp. 427-452. 
Ro.senau, James N. ~Attentive PQ.'blic ~ Foreign _Policy: ! Theory .2f 
Growth and Some New Evidence. Research Monograph No. 31, Center of 
Inter.natiOnar-8tUdies, Princeton University. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press1 1968. 
Rosenau, James N. 
Formulation. 
Public Opinion ~ Foreign Poli~: ~ Operational 
New York~ Random House, 1961. 
Shanks, Michael, and John Lambert. The Common Market Today-~ Tomorrow. 
New Yorkz Frederick A. Praeger;-1962. 
Shlaim, Avi. nBritain's Quest for a World Role." 
tions, V (1975), pp. 838-856. 
International Rela-=~=;,;,.;,;;o.=--...;-
Siegel, Sidney~ 
New York~ 
]ionparametric Statistics for ~ Be4avioral Sciences. 
McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1956. 
Siepmann, Charles A. "Propaganda Techniques. 11 Voice of ~ People~ 
Readings _in Public Opinion ~.f!'opaganda~ __ 2nd ed. Ed. Reo M. 
Christenson and Robert o. McWilliams. New-York; McGraw-Hill Book 
Co.~ 1967, PP• 331-339. 
Sun (London), 1 December 1966-30 April 1967, 1 December 1974-30 April 
1975 (Chicago: University of Chicago Library Photoduplication, 
n.d.). · · 
Tannenbaum, Percy H. 11Mediated Generalization of Attitude Change Via 
the Principle of Congruity." Readings-~ Attitude Changee Ed. 
Samuel Himmelfarb and Alice Hendrickson Eagly. New York: John 
Wiley and Sons, 1974~ pp. 210-217a 
United Nations. UNESCO. World Press Newspapers ~ .~ Agencies. 
Amsterdam: Drukkery, 1964Q 
Wilkerson, Marjorie. Ne~s ~ Newspapers. London: B. T. Batsford, 
Ltd., 1970. 
75 
Zajonc, Robert B. "Attitudinal Effects of Mere Exposure." Readings _!!! 
Attitude Change. Ed. Samuel H:immelfarb and Alice H. Eagly. New 
YorlC~ John Wiley and Sons, 1974, pp. 52-80. 
Zakheim, Dov s. "Britain and the EEG-Opinion Poll Data 1970-72." 
JC?~:mal of CC?rmnon Market Studies, XI (1973), pp. 191-233· 
Zurcher, Arnold J. The struggle to Unite Europe, ~1958~ New York: 
New York University Press, 1958~ - - -· · · 
APPENDIX A 
SINGlE CURVE SOURCES 
76 
APPENDIX A 
SINGLE CURVE SOURCES 
Since public discussion of British membership in the Common Market 
began, there has been a staggering number of opinion surveys on the 
issue. Widely varied questions-each_ <;>f whic~ elicits a slightly dif-
ferent response-ha~e qeen used to probe the isl31.lee The absence of a 
single instrument's history over the 1B year period complicates the task 
of recounting the overall trend on _t?e _-issue. 
Only two isolated questions prior to 1960 are deemed pertinent to 
a summary of views on British memb~r~.h~:p_ ~ -~he Common Market. However, 
a set of five questions was found to span the entire period subsequent 
to July, 1960. While these questions do measure different shades of 
opinion, the composite series is accepted as adequately representative 
of the overall vissicitudes of the issue. The composition of the curve 
is detailed below. 1 
Isolated Questions 
Taking everything into account, do you think that Britain should 
or should not join the European Common Market ---scheme? · 
Should Should not Don't know 
-
September, 1957 20 42 
1Except as otherwise noted, source is Gallup Poll, Ltd., "British 
Attitudes Towards the Common Market" (unpublished data, June, 1975). 
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Six countries on the Cont:inent are jo:in:ing together for the pul'-
poses of trade. Do you th:ink it would be a good idea or a bad 
idea for Brita:in to try to jo:in the Conunon Market? 
Good idea Bad idea Don't know 
-- -- -
March, 1959 54 12 34 
Recurr:ing Questions 
If the British Government were to decide that Brita:in's :interest 
would best be served by jo:ining the European Comri1on Market, wquld 
you approve or disa~prove? 
July, 1960 
June, 1961 
June, 1961 
July, 1961 
July, 1961 
July, 1961 
July~ 1961 
August, 1961 
August, 1961 
August, 1961 
August, 1961 
August, 1961 
September, 1961 
September, 1961 
October,. 1961 
October, 1961 
November, 1961 
December, 1961 
January/February, 1962. 
March, 1962 
Apr:i,l, 1962 
. May, 1962 
June, 1962 
June, 1962 
July, .1962 
August, 1962 
August, 1962 
September, 1962 
September, 1962 · 
October, 1962' ' 
October, 1962 
October, 1962 
October, 1962 
November, 1962 
November, 19S2 
November, 1962 
Approve 
49 
46 
44 
38 
36 
38 
4D 
44 
48 
46 
45 
49 
52 
51 
48 
48 
52 
53 
47 
49 
47 
47 
37 
36 
42 
39 
4D 
44 
'46 
44 
41. 
49 
58 
45 
42 
50 
Disapprove 
13 
20 
20 
22 
22 
23 
24 
22 
20 
20 
20 
19 
18 
18 
18 
18 
19 
19 
22 
23 
27 2l 
31 
30 
25 
29 
34 
32 
30 
27 
26 
27 
22 
27 
31 
23 
Don't know 
~···.-
38 
34 
36 
4D 
44 
39 
36 
34 
32 
34 
35 
32 
30 
31 
34 
34 
29 
28 
31 
28 
26 
32 
32 
34 
33 
32 
26 
24 
24 
29 
33 
24 
20 
28 
27 
27 
December, 1962 
December, 1962 
January, 1963 
48 
37 
41 
26 
29 
30 
26 
34 
29 
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The preceding question was again used after February, 1965, but 
until that time, the following question was asked: 
If an opportunity occurs for Britain to join the Common Market, 
would you like to s_ee us try or . drop the idea altoe;ether? 
..'!l'z to join Drop the idea Don't know 
-
February/March~ 1963 42 37 21 
June, 1963 46 25 29 
July, 1963 46 29 25 
September, 1963 46 36 18 
November~ 1963 49 32 19 
December, 1963 42 34 24 
January~ 1964 4D 36 24 
February, 1964 42 33 25 
July, 1964 41 37 22 
November, 1964 44 28 28 
January~ 1965 48 30 22 
If the British Gover.nment were to decide that Britain's interest 
would best be served by joining the European Common Market, would 
you approve or disapprove? - · · 
Approve Disapprove Don't know 
-
February, 1965 59 19 22 
March, 1965 65 14 21 
April, 1965 51 25 24 
May, 1965 60 19 21 
May/ June, 1965 55 21 24 
June, 1965 56 20 24 
July, 1965 56 22 22 
August, 1965 47 18 35 
September, 1965 55 ).5 30 
October, 1965 54 18 28 
November, 1965 60 17 23 
December~ 1965 66 15 19 
January, 1966 60 15 25 
February, 1966 59 18 23 
March, 1966 68 14 ••• •••• v-·--··---<•·-··--""'""•~ •• ' 18 
May, 1966 70 10 20 
Jti.ne, 1 966 61 16 23 
July, 1966 71 12 17 
August, 1966 70 12 18 
September, 1966 67 13 20 
octobe:r, '1966 68 14 18 
November, 1966 65 14 21 
November, 1966 67 17 16 
December, 1966 
January, · 1967 
February, 1967. 
March, 1967 · 
April, 1967: 
66 
65 
61 
57 
43 
16 
18 
20 
27 
30 
18 
17 
19 
16 
27 
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Do you approve or disapprove of the Government applying for mem-
bership of the European Common Market? · 
Approve Disapprove Don't know 
-
May, 1967 36 41 23 
May, 1967 36 41 23 
June, 1967 40 39 21 
June, 1967 40 45 15 
September, 1967 40 41 19 
October, 1967 46 34 20 
November, 1967 37 44 19 
November, 1967 44 37 19 
December, 1967 43 40 17 
J~e, 1968 36 43 21 
In the following year, a previously used question was again use~ 
before returning to the above question: 
If an opportunity occurs for Britain to join the Common Market, 
would you like to see us try or drop the idea altogether? 
May, 1969 
June, 1969 
September, 1969 
41 
34 
26 
44 
45 
57 
Don't know 
.......-
15 
21 
16 
Do you approve or disapprove of the Government applying for mem-
bership of the European Common Market? 
Approve Disap;prove Don't know 
-
November, 1969 36 45 19 
February, 1970 22 57 21 
April, 1970 19 59 22 
July, 1970 24 55 21 
July, 1970 22 57 20 \ September, 1970 21 56 23 
October, 1970 22 56 22 
November, 1970 16 66 18 
January, 1971 22 58 20 
March, 1971 19 6o 22 
April, 1971 22 6o 19 
May, 1971 23 59 18 
May, 1971 20 57 22 
June, 1971 27 58 15 
J-gne, 1971 
June, 1971 
21 
24 
58 
6o 
21 
16 
On the facts as you know t~em, are you for or aga:inst Brita:in 
jo:in:ing the Common Market? 
!2! Aga:inst Don't know 
-
July, 1971 25 57 18 
July, 1971 33 49 17 
July, 1971 33 4h 20 
July, 1971 35 44 20 
August, 1971 39 43 17 
Septemb~r, 1971 35 47 18 
September, 1971 31 52 17 
October, 1971 32 51 17 
November, 1971 38 45 17 
November, 1971 44 41 16 
December, 1971 38 47 15 
January, 1972 42 41 17 
February, 1972 42 41 17 
March/ April, 1972 43 43 14 
Ap~May, 1972 41 45 14 
June July, 1972 36 51 13 
August, 1972 40 42 18 
September, 1972 40 46 14 
October, 1972 35 44 20 
October, 1972 39 41 20 
November/December, 1972 39 45 16 
The f:inal source used :in the s:ingle __ c~rve is simply, 
Do you th:ink that we were right or wrong to jo:in the __ Q~rr.unon 
Market? 
Right Wrong Don't know 
-
J anua:cy, 1973 38 36 26 
March/April, 1973 40 42 19 
April/May, 1973 36 45 19 
June, 1973 39 44 17 
August, 1973 32 52 16 
September, 1973 35 49 17 
October, 1973 34 49 17 
November, 1973 34 48 18 
February, 197 4 28 58 14 
March/April, 1974 36 51 14 
April, 1974 33 51 17 
2aesponses for Julythrough October, 1.971, and for February, 1972 
are from Dov s. Zakheim, "Britai,n and the EE~p:inion Poll Data 1970-72," . ,1 
Jour.nal of Common Market Studies, XI (1973), p. 192. 
- . 
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May, 1974 32 53 15 
July, 1974 37 50 13 
August, 1974 31 53 16 
October, 1974 34 46 20 
January, 1975 31 50 19 
February/March, 1975 39 45 16 
March, 1975 37 42 21 
March, 1975 44 38 18 
April, 1975 43 38 18 
April, 1975 46 36 18 
April, 1975 42 38 19 
April, 1975 42 38 20 
AprilJMay, 1975 42 42 16 
May, 1975 45 37 18 
May, 1975 46 39 15 
May, 19?5 44 4D 16 
May/June, 1975 44 36 20 
The Referendum Question 
After the referendum question phrasing was decided, the following 
question was asked in addition to the.oi1~ ?-b<:>ve. The difference in the 
wording of the query apparently elicited a stronger pro-~ar.k~teer re-
sponse: The figures given in parentheses indicate t~e amount of increase. 
If the question in the referendum were "Do. you think that the 
United Kingdom should stay in the European Conmrunitx (the Common 
Market?n~how would you vote? 
~' ·~tay,!!! No, leave Don't know 
- .. 
-
April, 1975 57 +15l 28 -10) 15 
-4l April, 1975 58 16 30 -8) 12 -8 April/May, 1975 57 +15 33 -9~ 10 -6 May, 19?5 6o +15 29 -8 11 -7 
May, 1975 61 +15l 29 -10) 10 -5~ May, 1975 59 +15 31 -9) 10 -6 
May/June, 1975 61 +17 29 -7) 10 -10) 
Since the referendum did not allow "don't know" as a response, the 
"yes" and "no" responses alone should be considered to evaluate the accu-
racy of the Gallup data. Excluding the DKs, 67.8 percent in the last 
poll (three days pri,or to the referendU:JII} ~d~cated qm affirmative re-
sponse. The actual pro-Market vote was 67.2 percent. 
APPENDIX B 
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APPENDIX B 
CIRCULATION WEIGHTING 
Because the purpose of this study is (as is implied in the title) 
to assess the impact of the national daily newspapers on the British 
public in the context of the Common Market issue, the relative numbers 
of readers for each_pa:per must necessarily be considered in each phase. 
However, no objective figures on readerships were found. The second-
best consideration selected was relative circulation. 
The Editor and Publisher Company an.nually furnishes average daily 
circulation figures of the world's major newspapers. _ Though some of the 
circulation f~gures are certified counts, others are estimates. still, 
no better figures were found. For the source of the December, 1966 
through April, 1967 circulation weights, the figures, for 1967 were used 
(1968) edition); for the December, 1974 through April, 1975 weights, it 
was necessary to use 1974 figures (1975 edition) because the 1975 figures 
will not be available until F_ebruary, 1976. 
The eirculati0n weighting used in testing all folir hypotheses may 
be examined in Table X. 
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TABLE X 
CIRCULATION WEIGHTING, 1967 AND 1974 
1967 1974 
Paper Circulation Weight Circulation Weight 
Daily Mirror 5,077,548 ·415 4,288,746 ·330 
Daily ~ress 3,963,189 
-324 3,163,053 -243 
Daily Telegraph 1,411,925 .115 1,406,699 .108 
Sun 1,160,686 .095 3,446,795 • 265 
':[:'imes 334,142 .027 339,594 .026 
Guardian 288,000 .024 358,895 .028 
Totals 12,235,490 i.ooo 1.000 
Source: 1967-"Daily Newspapers of Great Britain and Ireland-
Personnel, .Ci:r-culations, Rates," Editor ~ Publisher International 
Yearbook:-1998 (New York, 1968), p. 468; 1974:--"Daily Newspapers of 
Great Britain and Ireland--Personnel, Circulations, Advertising Rates, 
etc.," Editor and Pub~isher International Yearbook--1975 (New York, ) - - -1975 , P• 420. 
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APPENDIX C 
SAMPLING PROCEDURES 
In 1966 and 1967, at the time of the first public opinion tum-
around on Common Market membership, there were eight major British 
National dailies. Before the second turnaround, in 1974 and 1975, the 
Daily Sketch was. discontinued, ~eay:LJ:lg only seven national dailies • 
.And because the Daily ~ was unavailable for e~ation, only six 
of the remaining seven papers were included in the sampling . t.rame. 
Because the British daily papers do not publish issues for Sundays, 
New Year's Day, nor on Christmas Day, the sampling frame cons~sted of 
i 
774 issues from December, 1966 through April, 1967; and of 762 issues 
from December, 1974 through April, 1975. The frames differ in number 
because in the earlier period, Christmas and New Year's Day fell on Sun-
day. The total sample frame consisted of 1536 issues. 
The sample frame was stratified into months. Levine and Elzey's 
table of random numbers determined two dates within each month for each 
of the six dailies. 1 From October, 1975 through February, 1976, the 
samples were sought. Most were obtained through the interlibrary loan 
system. However, 1975 issues for the Guardian and the Daily Express 
will not be available until December, 1976. The publishers of those 
papers were contacted in an effort to obtain the samples, but they 
1samuel Levine and Freeman F. Elzey, ! Programme~ Introduction to 
Research (Belmont, Ca., 1968), P• 83. 
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could not furnish the copies. On March 2, 1976, the remaining 16 issues 
were found to be available in electrostatic copies through Zerox Uni-
versity Microfilms (Ann Arbor, Michigan), but only at a cost of $10 per 
issue. Because this expense was not felt to be reasonable, the unavail-
able 1975 samples were re-drawn from December, 1974, using random num-
bers from Babbie. 2 Selection results are shown in Figure 5, and the 
sample is detailed in Table XI. 
31 
22 
28 21 
27 20 
26 16 
23 13 30 
25 15 6 8 12 
29 24 9 2 4 11 
19 5 18 7 1 ~ 10 14 17 0 1 2 
.3 4 5 6 7 8 
Selection Frequency 
Figure 5. Results of Random Date Selection. 
~arl R. Babb~~, The Practice~ Social Research (Belmont, Ca., 
1975), PP• 472-475. 
,, 
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TABLE XI 
THE SAMPLE 
Daily Daily Daily 
Mirror E!eress Tele~raEh Sun Times Guardian 
Month Day ID Day ID Day ID Day ID Day ID Day ID 
1966 Dec 06 01 17 21 06 41 30 61 02 81 28 101 
12 02 31 22 10 42 31 62 30 82 17 102 
1967 Jan 05 03 23 23 12 43 14 63 03 83 10 103 
23 04 31 24 27 44 16 64 11 84 30 104 
1967 Feb 11 05 04 25 24 45 16 65 14 85 06 105 
14 06 09 26 11 46 22 66 21 86 08 106 
1967 Mar 07 07 02 27 02 47 08 67 01 87 03 107 
31 08 24 28 29 48 20 68 07 88 15 108 
.. 
. .. . .. 
1967 Apr 07 09 26 29 03 49 13 69 18 89 04 109 
25 10 27 30 26 50 20 70 10 90 17 110 
1974 Dec 10 11 04 31 12 51 20 71 04 91 11 111 
11 12 09 32 30 52 27 72 28 92 23 112 
1975 Jan 03 13 08* 33 18 53 14 73 16 93 21* 113 
10 14 .30* 34 11 54 20 74 17 94 28* 114 
1975 Feb 13 15 12* 35 12 55 22 75 01 95 04* 115 
14 16 17* 36 14 56 25 76 14- 96' 21* 116 
1975 Mar 10 17 01* 37 12 57 01 77 09 97 06* 117 
26 18 22* 38 22 58 13 78 30 98 08* 118 
1975 Apr 15 19 02* 39 15 59 03 79 13 99 08* 119 
16 20 21* 40 17 60 15 80 17 100 17* 120 
*These 1975 issues of the Daily E!eres~ and the Guardian will be 
unavailable until late 1976. The following random dates from December, 
1974 were substituted: Daily E!eress: 2, 6, 7, 10, 24, 28, 30, 31; for 
the Guaroian: 2, 6, 7, 10, i2~ i4, 16, 21. 
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